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his Article examines the nature of the guarantee of self-
representation as exercised in the Milosevic case at the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The paper 
debates the manner in which the Milosevic Trial Chamber and the Ap-
peals Chamber of the ICTY balanced the competing interests of the pro 
se rights of the Accused and the need for expedition in the trial. It is ar-
gued that the Trial Chamber disproportionately restricted the rights of the 
Accused in a dubiously reasoned decision, a mistake that was partially 
remedied by the Appeals Chamber, but which has left a legacy that po-
tentially endangers the rights of the accused which subsist in an already 
precarious environment. The Article concludes with an examination of 
the merits of hybrid representation in high-level cases such as that of 
Slobodan Milosevic. 
T 
SECTION ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The death of Slobodan Milosevic in his cell at the United Nations De-
tention Unit of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo-
slavia (ICTY) in The Hague on March 11, 2006,1 has raised the question 
of what can now be salvaged from a trial that ran for over four years and 
generated forests of testimony, exhibits, litigation, decisions, and ap-
peals.2 One question that must be asked in the wake of the former Presi-
dent’s death is whether it is appropriate for high-profile criminal defen-
dants to represent themselves. “Once left to a handful of political dissi-
dents and lawyer-haters, self-representation no longer is rare.”3 High-
profile defendants often seek to utilize their statutory right to represent 
themselves in person before international and regional tribunals in a bid 
to secure control over a specific defense strategy, often politically moti-
vated.4
 
 1. Molly Moore & Daniel Williams, Milosevic Found Dead in Prison; Genocide 
Trial Is Left Without a Final Judgment, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2006, at A01. 
 2. Over forty-nine thousand pages of transcript were recorded by the last day of trial 
on March 1, 2006. Trial Tr. at 49,190 (Mar. 1, 2006), Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. 
IT-02-54-T, available at http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/060301IT.htm. By November 
22, 2006, there had been 2,256 filings, comprising 63,775 pages; 930 prosecution exhib-
its; 85,526 pages of prosecution evidence; 117 videos of prosecution evidence; and 
1,245,084 pages of prosecution disclosure, 930,553 of which were under ICTY Rule 68.. 
 3. Tom Sowa, Rising to Their Own Defense; High Legal Bills Just One Reason for 
“Pro Se” Cases, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Spokane, Wash.), Mar. 29, 1999, at A1. 
 4. Those who have featured prominently in the public eye include Theodore Kac-
zynski, John Allen Muhammad, Zacarias Moussaoui, Ted Bundy, Douglas Clark, Charles 
Manson, Colin Ferguson, Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman, Vojislav Seselj, Hinga Norman, 
and Slobodan Milosevic. 
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An all-encompassing set of principles regarding the scope of the right 
of criminal defendants to self-representation has not yet been expressed.5 
The relative significance of the right to self-representation6 “needs to be 
defined carefully, particularly in situations when it comes into apparent 
conflict with the due process guarantee of a fair trial.”7 There are “inher-
ent tensions between these competing interests” which necessitate “close 
judicial scrutiny.”8 International criminal courts and tribunals must ad-
dress this tension in a systematic fashion in order to obtain a satisfactory 
equilibrium between these competing interests. 
This Article contends that the improvised approach adopted by the 
Trial Chamber of the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Milosevic9 to assess the im-
portance of the pro se right weighed disproportionately on the side of 
expedition. This imbalance was somewhat remedied by the subsequent 
decision of the Appeals Chamber. As it stands, however, the jurispru-
dence generated by this case has markedly broadened the potential cir-
cumstances in which the right to self-representation may be curtailed, 
leaving open the possibility of further abrogation not only of the pro se 
right but also of the other minimum guarantees from which the right to a 
defense is cast. 
1.1: The Right to Self-Representation 
In Milosevic, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY (Trial Chamber) recog-
nized that “the international and regional conventions (in similar lan-
guage) plainly articulate a right to defend oneself in person.”10 The right 
to self-representation appears in identical terms in Articles 14(3)(d) of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),11 
21(4)(d) of the ICTY Statute,12 20(4)(d) of the Statute of the Interna-
 
 5. Robert R. Homiak, Comment, Faretta v. California and the Pro Se Defense: The 
Constitutional Right of Self-Representation, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 897, 936 (1976). 
 6. The terms “pro se” and “self-representation” will be used interchangeably in this 
paper. 
 7. Homiak, supra note 5, at 936. 
 8. Id. 
 9. All references herein to Prosecutor v. Milosevic or Milosevic are to the case of 
Slobodan Milosevic.  
 10. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on the 
Prosecution Motion Concerning Assignment of Counsel, para. 36 (Apr. 4, 2003), avail-
able at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/decision-e/040403.htm. 
 11. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14(3)(d), adopted Dec. 
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 12. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 
21(4)(d), May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192 [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. 
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tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),13 and 17(4)(d) of the Stat-
ute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL).14 Articles 67(1)(d) of 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),15 6(3)(c) of 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights) (ECHR),16 
8(2)(d) of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR),17 and 
16(d) of the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major 
War Criminals of the European Axis (Nuremberg Charter)18 contain 
analogous provisions. 
The right to self-representation is, under the ICTY Statute, one of a ba-
sic set of “minimum guarantees” to which the accused is entitled “in full 
equality.”19 Among the other guarantees listed in Article 21(4) of the 
ICTY Statute are defendants’ right to remain silent;20 to confront the wit-
nesses against them;21 “to be tried without undue delay;”22 and to court-
appointed counsel “where the interests of justice so require, and without 
 
 13. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 20(4)(d), Nov. 8, 
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1602 [hereinafter ICTR Statute]. 
 14. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 17(4)(d), Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 
U.N.T.S. 145 [hereinafter Statute of the SCSL]. 
 15. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 67, opened for signature 
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (granting the right “to con-
duct the defence in person or through legal assistance of the accused’s choosing, . . . and 
to have legal assistance assigned by the Court in any case where the interests of justice so 
require”). 
 16. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms art. 6(3)(c), Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [herein-
after European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)] (granting an accused the right “to 
defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not 
sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice 
so require”). 
 17. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 
8(2)(d), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR] 
(granting an accused “[t]he right to defend himself personally or to be assisted by legal 
counsel of his own choosing”). 
 18. Agreement by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional Gov-
ernment of the French Republic and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the Euro-
pean Axis, Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 16(d), Aug. 8, 1945, 82 
U.N.T.S. 279 (granting an accused “the right to conduct his own defence before the Tri-
bunal or to have the assistance of Counsel”). 
 19. ICTY Statute, supra note 12, art. 21(4). 
 20. Id. art. 21(4)(g). 
 21. Id. art. 21(4)(e). 
 22. Id. art. 21(4)(c). 
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payment by him” in the case of indigence.23 The Appeals Chamber of the 
ICTY has acknowledged that by placing the right to self-representation 
“on a structural par” with these guarantees, the drafters of the ICTY 
Statute recognized the right to self-representation as “an indispensable 
cornerstone of justice.”24
Article 21(4)(d) incorporates a “binary opposition between representa-
tion ‘through legal assistance’ and representation ‘in person.’”25 The per-
sonal character of the individual’s procedural rights is recognized by ac-
knowledging the defendant’s right to make his own choice.26 The pro se 
right “embodies one of the most cherished ideals of civilization: the right 
of an individual to determine his own destiny.”27 Furthermore, the pro se 
process “affirm[s] the dignity and autonomy of the accused.”28 On the 
other hand, it has been recognized that “[t]he presence of counsel serves 
both to protect the accused from prosecutorial overreaching and to pre-
serve society’s interest in the integrity of the judicial process.”29 The 
benefits derived from the presence of counsel in certain circumstances 
have spurred contemporary criminal tribunals to make self-representation 
a qualified, and not an absolute, guarantee.30
It is widely recognized that the right to self-representation “is not cate-
gorically inviolable.”31 For example, various common law jurisdictions 
recognize the capacity of courts to restrict the pro se right in sexual as-
 
 23. Id. art. 21(4)(d). 
 24. Milosevic v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory 
Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defence Counsel, para. 11 
(Nov. 1, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/appeal/decision-
e/041101.htm. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See Note, The Accused as Co-Counsel: The Case for the Hybrid Defense, 12 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 329, 350 (1978) [hereinafter Hybrid Defense]. 
 27. People v. Gordon, 688 N.Y.S.2d 380, 382 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999). 
 28. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176–77 (1984). 
 29. Judith Welcom, Note, Assistance of Counsel: A Right to Hybrid Representation, 
57 B.U. L. REV. 570, 571 (1977). 
 30. See Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Decision on the Application 
of Samuel Hinga Norman for Self Representation Under Article 17(4)(d) of the Statute of 
the Special Court, paras. 9, 15 (June 8, 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/CDF-
decisions.html (scroll down page to “Trial Chamber Decisions”); Prosecutor v. Seselj, 
Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order Appointing Counsel 
to Assist Vojislav Seselj with his Defence, para. 20 (May 9, 2003), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/seselj/trialc/decision-e/030509.htm. 
 31. Milosevic v. Prosecutor, IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of 
the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, para. 12 (Nov. 1, 
2004). 
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sault trials “to protect vulnerable witnesses from trauma.”32 Furthermore, 
in the United States, the right to self-representation does not extend to 
appellate proceedings.33 Civil law jurisdictions further restrict the pro se 
right by often forcing representation by counsel upon defendants “in se-
rious criminal cases.”34 This practice has been upheld by the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).35
The importance of the right to self-representation is not diminished by 
the fact that other interests may supersede it.36 As eloquently put by Col-
quitt, “[j]ustice, it seems, begs for the striking of balances and the fash-
ioning of procedural accommodations.”37 It is, of course, essential to 
 
 32. Milosevic v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory 
Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, para. 12 
(Nov. 1, 2004). These common law jurisdictions include England (Youth Justice and 
Criminal Evidence Act, 1999, part II, c. II, §§ 34–35 (Eng. & Wales)), Scotland (Crimi-
nal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, sec. 288C(1), as amended by the Sexual Offences 
(Procedure and Evidence) (Scotland) Act 2002, asp. 9, § 1), Canada (Criminal Code, RS 
1985, sec. 486 (2.3), New Zealand (Evidence Act 1908, 1908 S.N.Z. No. 56, § 23F), and 
Australia (Crimes Act, 1914, §§ 15YF–15YH (as amended); Evidence Act, 1906, § 106G 
(W.A.); Criminal Procedure Act, 1986, § 294A (N.S.W.); Sexual Offences (Evidence and 
Procedure) Act, 1983, § 5 (N. Terr.); Evidence Act, 1977, § 21(L)-(S) (Queensl.)). Mil-
osevic, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the As-
signment of Defense Counsel, para. 12 & n. 33–37 (citing the foregoing national stat-
utes).  
 33. Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152 (2000). 
 34. Milosevic v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory 
Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, para. 12 
n.38 (Nov. 1, 2004) (citing C. PR. PÉN. Arts. 274, 317 (Fr.); Strafprozeßordnung [StPO] 
[Code of Criminal Procedure] Apr. 7, 1987, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl. I] 1074, 
§140 (F.R.G.); Code D’Instruction Criminelle [Criminal Instruction Code] of 9 Decem-
ber 1808 art. 294 (Belg.); Arts. 282–83, Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of 
Korea; Art. 71(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia); 
Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order 
Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with his Defence, paras. 16–17 (citing Sec-
tion 731 of the Danish Administration of Justice Act; Criminal Procedure Act of the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia arts. 13, 71). Beginning in 1992, the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia consisted of Serbia and Montenegro. Montenegro declared independence 
from the political entity of Serbia and Montenegro on June 3, 2006. U.S. Dep’t of State, 
Bureau of Eur. and Eurasian Affairs, Background Note: Montenegro (Aug. 2006), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/70949.htm. 
 35. See, e.g., Croissant v. F.R.G., 237 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 20, 32 (1992). The 
United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC) has also upheld a national court’s re-
quirement that persons not possessing a law degree be represented by counsel. Torregrosa 
Lafuente v. Spain, Communication No. 866/1999, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/72/D/866/1999 
(2001). 
 36. Joseph A. Colquitt, Hybrid Representation: Standing the Two-Sided Coin on Its 
Edge, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 55, 65 (2003). 
 37. Id. at 127. 
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“balance the rights and interests of defendants against other important 
rights and interests in a manner fair to all” parties, without excluding vic-
tims, witnesses, or defendants.38
Recognizing that a defendant’s right to represent himself or herself is 
subject to some limitations does not, however, resolve the issue at hand. 
It must also be shown that the restriction applied was justified and pro-
portionate to the interest pursued. Section Two explores the balancing of 
the interests of the accused with the interests of victims, witnesses, and 
the Tribunal itself. Section Three will analyze the balancing of these 
rights in the curtailment of the pro se right in Milosevic, and Section Four 
expands upon the need for proportionality in such balancing exercises. 
1.2: Milosevic at the ICTY 
Slobodan Milosevic was indicted at the Yugoslavia Tribunal on May 
24, 1999, for alleged atrocities committed in Kosovo.39 He remained in 
power as Yugoslav President until October 200040 and was re-elected 
leader of Serbia’s Socialist Party in November 2000.41 The former Presi-
dent was finally transferred to The Hague in June 2001,42 and, in No-
vember 2001, was charged with twenty-nine criminal counts, including 
genocide, with regard to his involvement in the Bosnian War from 1992–
95.43 Two further indictments were brought against him, with five counts 
 
 38. Id. at 65. 
 39. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37, Indictment (May 24, 1999), avail-
able at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-ii990524e.htm. The Kosovo In-
dictment was twice subsequently amended, Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37-
I, Amended Indictment (June 29, 2001), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-ai010629e.htm; Prosecutor v. Milosevic, 
Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Second Amended Indictment (Oct. 29, 2001), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-2ai011029e.htm, and later joined with the 
indictments concerning Bosnia and Croatia, see infra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 40. Alissa J. Rubin, A Year Gone By, but Still a Pall Remains; Yugoslavia: Anniver-
sary of Milosevic’s Toppling Comes Amid Continued Economic Despair as Well as Po-
litical Bickering and Stalled Reforms, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2001, at A22.  
 41. Carlotta Gall, Milosevic Wins Re-election as Leader of Socialist Party, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 26, 2000, at A10. 
 42. R. Jeffrey Smith, Serb Leaders Hand Over Milosevic for Trial by War Crimes 
Tribunal; Extradition Sparks Crisis in Belgrade, WASH. POST, June 29, 2001, at A1. 
 43. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-01-51-I Indictment (Nov. 22, 2001), avail-
able at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-ii011122e.htm; see William Droz-
diak, Milosevic to Face Genocide Trial for Role in the War in Bosnia; Yugoslav Ex-
Leader First Head of State to Be So Charged, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2001, at A22. The 
Bosnia Indictment was joined with those concerning Croatia and Kosovo, see infra note 
47 and accompanying text, and subsequently amended. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. 
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concerning his activities in Kosovo in 199944 and a further thirty-two 
relating to Croatia in 1991–92.45 The three indictments were joined to-
gether by the Appeals Chamber,46 and the trial commenced on February 
12, 2002.47 Until his death on March 11, 2006, Milosevic stood accused 
of sixty-six counts, comprising seventeen substantive crimes.48
1.3: Milosevic: Self-Representation 
From the outset, Slobodan Milosevic indicated that he wished to repre-
sent himself and, accordingly, did not wish to be represented by coun-
 
IT-02-54-T, Amended Indictment (Apr. 21, 2004), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-ai040421-e.htm. 
 44. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Second Amended Indictment 
(Oct. 29, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-
2ai011029e.htm. 
 45. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Second Amended Indictment (July 
28, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-2ai020728e.htm. 
 46. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case Nos. IT-99-37-AR73, IT-01-50-AR73, IT-01-51-
AR73, Decision on Prosecution Interlocutory Appeal from Refusal to Order Joinder (Feb. 
1, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milutinovic/appeal/decision-e/ 
20201JD317089.htm. See Milosevic, Case Nos. IT-99-37-AR73, IT-01-50-AR73, IT-01-
51-AR73, Reasons for Decision on Prosecution Interlocutory Appeal from Refusal to 
Order Joinder (Apr. 18, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/ 
appeal/decision-e/020418.htm. The Trial Chamber had joined two of the three indict-
ments, those relating to Croatia and Bosnia, but ordered the Kosovo indictment to be tried 
separately. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case Nos. IT-99-37-PT, IT-01-50-PT, IT-01-51-PT, 
Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Joinder (Dec. 13, 2001), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/milutinovic/appeal/decision-e/11213JD516912.htm. The Trial 
Chamber has, on more than one occasion, contemplated the possibility of severance. See, 
e.g., Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Further Order on Future Conduct of 
the Trial Relating to Severance of One or More Indictments (July 21, 2004), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/order-e/051122.htm; id., IT-02-54-T, Decision in 
Relation to Severance, Extension of Time and Rest (Dec. 12, 2005).  
 47. Trial Tr. at 1 (Feb. 12, 2002), Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, 
available at http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/020212IT.htm. 
 48. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Second Amended Indictment, 
paras. 34–83 (July 28, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-
2ai020728e.htm (charging Milosevic with thirty-two counts); Prosecutor v. Milosevic, 
Case No. IT-02-54-T, Amended Indictment, paras. 32–45 (Apr. 21, 2004), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-ai040421-e.htm (charging Milosevic with 
twenty-nine counts); Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Second Amended 
Indictment, paras. 62–68 (Oct. 29, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/ 
english/mil-2ai011029e.htm (charging Milosevic and others with five counts). As noted, 
the Appeals Chamber joined the three indictments together in February 2002. Supra note 
46 and accompanying text. 
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sel.49 This appears to have been motivated by his non-recognition of the 
Tribunal’s legitimacy.50 Judge May assured the Accused in July 2001 
that “[y]ou do have the right, of course, to defend yourself.”51 The fol-
lowing month, the Trial Chamber invited the Registrar to appoint amici 
curiae, not to represent Milosevic but rather to ensure a fair trial and “as-
sist [the Chamber] in the proper determination of the case.”52 In order to 
assist the Chamber to secure a fair trial, the amici were to bring “excul-
patory or mitigating evidence” to the Trial Chamber’s attention,53 to in-
form the Chamber of any defenses the Accused could properly raise,54 to 
“mak[e] submissions as to the relevance . . . of the NATO air campaign 
in Kosovo,”55 and to identify witnesses whom the Chamber could call.56 
The Chamber further enhanced the rights of the Accused in April 2002 
by recognizing his right to communicate with legal advisers57 and by 
granting him privileged communication with named Legal Associates.58 
 
 49. Written Note by the Accused, Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37-I, Reg-
istry pgs. 3371–72 (July 3, 2001) (confidential document on file with author).  
 50. Trial Tr. at 2806:2–3 (Apr. 10, 2002), Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-
54-T, available at http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/020410IT.htm (Milosevic: “I cannot 
appoint a lawyer, an attorney for myself, in front of an institution that I don’t recog-
nise.”). 
 51. Id. at 1:19–20 (July 3, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/ 
010703IA.htm. 
 52. Id. at 7:5–15 (Aug. 30, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/ 
010830SC.htm; Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Order Inviting Designa-
tion of Amicus Curiae (Aug. 30, 2001), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/order-e/10830AO516194.htm. Steven Kay QC, 
Branislav Tapuskovic, and Mischa Wladimiroff were designated by the Registrar on Sep-
tember 6, 2001. Milosevic, Order Concerning the Provision of Documents to Amici Cu-
riae (Sept. 19, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/order-
e/10919DE516313.htm. The Accused was also permitted to discuss and supply them with 
copies of documents subject to Trial Chamber Orders imposing non-disclosure to third 
parties. 
 53. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order Inviting Designation of 
Amicus Curiae (Aug. 30, 2001). 
 54. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order Concerning Amici Curiae 
(Jan. 11, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/order-e/ 
20111AO517099.htm. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Prosecutor v Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order, para. 10 (Apr. 16, 2002). 
 58. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order, para. 14 (Apr. 16, 2002) 
(permitting Milosevic to have privileged communication with lawyers Zdenko Tomano-
vic and Dragoslav Ognjanovic). Branko Rakic was later appointed as a third “Associate.” 
Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defence Coun-
sel, para. 5 (Sept. 22, 2004) (citing Milosevic, Order Appointing Branko Rakic as Legal 
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In response to a suggestion in 2001 from the Prosecution that defense 
counsel should be assigned to the Accused alongside the Amici, the 
Chamber reiterated that “the accused has a right to counsel, but he also 
has a right not to have counsel.”59 The Trial Chamber consistently up-
held this position on the basis that “it would be wrong for the Chamber to 
impose counsel on the accused, because that would be in breach of the 
position under customary international law.”60
1.3.1: Prosecution Phase 
The Trial Chamber first expressed concern about the completion of the 
trial in November 2002 in light of the state of the Accused’s ill health.61 
The Prosecution again sought to have defense counsel imposed on the 
Accused on the basis that by proceeding pro se, the Accused had exacer-
bated his health problems.62 This, the Prosecution suggested, created 
“self-imposed” difficulties, dictated the scope of the trial, and obtained 
for the Accused a trial that was “significantly less complete than it would 
otherwise be.”63
This submission was rejected in December 200264 and written reasons 
were issued in April 2003.65 The Trial Chamber reasoned that the “pre-
sent circumstances” were not such that the tribunal could assign counsel 
 
Associate to the Accused (Oct. 23, 2003)), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/decision-e/040922.htm. 
 59. Trial Tr. at 18:3–4 (Aug. 30, 2001), Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37-
PT, available at http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/010830SC.htm. 
 60. Id. at 18:9–11. 
 61. Id. at 12727:10–12 (Nov. 1, 2002) (Case No. IT-02-54-T), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/021101IT.htm.  
 62. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on the 
Prosecution Motion Concerning Assignment of Counsel, para. 7 (Apr. 4, 2003) (citing 
Milosevic, Submission from the Office of the Prosecutor on the Future Conduct of the 
Case in the Light of the State of the Accused’s Health and the Length and Complexity of 
the Case (Nov. 8, 2002); Milosevic, Observations by the Amici Curiae on the Imposition 
of Defence Counsel on Accused (Nov. 18, 2002); Milosevic, Addendum to the Prosecu-
tion’s Response to the Confidential Observations by the Amici Curiae on the Health of 
the Accused and the Future Conduct of the Trial (Nov. 20, 2002)). 
 63. Id. para. 10 (quoting Milosevic, Submission from the Office of the Prosecutor on 
the Future Conduct of the Case in the Light of the State of the Accused’s Health and the 
Length and Complexity of the Case, para. 4 (Nov. 8, 2002)). 
 64. Trial Tr. at 14574:14–17 (Dec. 18, 2002), Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-
02-54-T (“[D]efence counsel will not be imposed upon the accused against his wishes in 
the present circumstances. It is not normally appropriate in adversarial proceedings such 
as these. The Trial Chamber will keep the position under review.”). 
 65. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on the 
Prosecution Motion Concerning Assignment of Counsel (Apr. 4, 2003). 
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contrary to the wishes of the accused.66 It noted that the duty imposed by 
Article 20(1) of the ICTY Statute to ensure a fair and expeditious trial 
must be implemented “‘with full respect for the rights of the accused.’”67 
Crucially, however, the Trial Chamber stressed that “there may be cir-
cumstances . . . where it is in the interests of justice to appoint counsel,” 
and resolved to “keep the position under review.”68
1.3.2: Defense Phase 
The ill health of the Accused began to cause more frequent disruption 
as the Prosecution phase of the trial advanced. During the Prosecution’s 
case, the trial was adjourned on several occasions for two to three weeks 
or more to allow the Accused to recuperate.69 Due to Milosevic’s high 
blood pressure and heart condition, his trial was reduced to a three-day 
week, and, further, to a four-hour day beginning September 2003.70 In an 
attempt to speed up proceedings, the Trial Chamber reduced the time 
 
 66. Id. para. 18. 
 67. Id. para. 41. 
 68. Id. para. 40. 
 69. See, e.g., Milosevic Trial Delayed Again Due to High Blood Pressure, IRISH 
TIMES, July 17, 2004, available at http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/world/ 
2004/0717/1605102285FR17MILOSEVIC.html (trial adjourned from mid-July 2004 to 
August 31, 2004 due to the Accused’s high blood pressure); Milosevic Trial Put Off to 
Give Him Rest, BIRMINGHAM POST (U.K.), Dec. 13, 2005, at 9 (trial adjourned “for six 
weeks to give [Milosevic] more rest”); see also Marlise Simons, Milosevic Now Faces 
Genocide Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2002, at A10 (noting the slowing of the trial’s 
pace due to concerns about Milosevic’s health). 
 70. Pursuant to the Medical Report of Dr. van Dijkman of August 26, 2002, the Trial 
Chamber mandated that four consecutive days of rest be given every two weeks of trial. 
Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of 
Defence Counsel, para. 53 (Sept. 22, 2004) (citing Medical Report of Dr. van Dijkman, 
Aug. 26, 2002). The trial continued as such until the end of September 2003 when, in 
accordance with further medical recommendations (Id., citing Medical Report of Dr. van 
Dijkman, Sept. 26, 2003), “the Trial Chamber decided to sit three days each week, to 
allow the Accused sufficient time to rest.” Id. (citing Trial Tr. at 27063 (Sept. 30, 2003), 
Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T). From then on, the trial ran from 9a.m. to 
1:45p.m. (with two fifteen minute intervals) three days per week. 
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available to the Prosecution,71 causing prosecutors to argue that “their 
case [wa]s being ‘emasculated.’”72
The Prosecution closed its case on February 25, 2004,73 at which stage 
sixty-six trial days had been lost.74 The Prosecution’s case was inter-
rupted on thirteen occasions on account of the Accused’s illness, eight of 
which related exclusively to the Accused’s high blood pressure.75 Be-
tween February and June 2004, doctors advised the Accused to rest for 
fifty-one weekdays.76 Due to Milosevic’s poor health, the Tribunal de-
layed the original starting date for the defense case, originally June 8, 
 
 71. Trial Tr. at 2784 (Apr. 10, 2002), Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T 
(“[W]e have decided that the Prosecution should have one year from today to conclude 
their case. That will give them a total of 14 months in which to finish the case, their case. 
In the view of the Trial Chamber, no Prosecution case should continue for a period longer 
than that.”); see Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Prosecu-
tion’s Request to Have Written Statements Admitted Under Rule 92bis, para. 27 (Mar. 
21, 2002) (limiting the number of Prosecution witnesses). 
 72. Mirko Klarin, War Crimes Manipulation; Slobodan Milosevic’s Refusal to Accept 
Help in His War Crimes Trial Is Making It Difficult to Provide Him a Fair Hearing, 
LONDON FREE PRESS (Ontario, Can.), Aug. 24, 2002, at F4. 
 73. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order Rescheduling and Setting 
the Time Available to Present the Defence Case, para. 2 (Feb. 25, 2004), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/order-e/040225.htm. 
 74. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order on Future Conduct of the 
Trial, para. 6 (July 6, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/order-
e/040706.htm. 
 75. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assign-
ment of Defence Counsel, para. 56 n.120 (Sept. 22, 2004). Of the sixty-six trial days lost, 
twenty-eight were in 2002, thirty-one in 2003, and seven in the first two months of 2004. 
Id. 
 76. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Scheduling Order for a Hearing, 
para. 11 (Nov. 22, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/order-
e/051122.htm (citing “Report by the Registrar Pursuant to the Trial Chamber’s ‘Omnibus 
Order on Matters Dealt with at the Pre-Defence Conference’, filed on 18 June 2004,” 
para. 7 (June 25, 2004)). This total amount of days was based on a five-day working 
week. Under a “three-day-per-week analysis,” the amount of days lost was thirty-one. 
The Accused was found to have used the equivalent of eleven of these days in prepara-
tion of his case. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Appeal Against the 
Trial Chamber’s Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel: Corrigendum, para. 5 
(Sept. 29, 2004) (referring to Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, 
“Report by the Registrar Pursuant to the Trial Chamber’s ‘Omnibus Order on Matters 
Dealt with at the Pre-Defence Conference’, filed on 18 June 2004,” para. 7 (June 25, 
2004)). 
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2004,77 on five occasions.78 Milosevic’s health was progressively be-
coming a major obstacle to the expeditious completion of the case. 
In July 2004, the Trial Chamber noted that on the basis of the time lost 
due to the Accused’s recurring ill health, it was “necessary to carry out a 
radical review of the future conduct of the trial.”79 At this stage of the 
trial, His Honor Judge May, who had been forced to resign due to ill 
health (and who subsequently died), had been replaced.80 Preemptively, 
the Chamber suggested that “it may be necessary to assign counsel to the 
Accused, and/or adopt other measures to ensure a fair and expeditious 
conduct of the trial.”81 It also noted “the resolve and determination of the 
Trial Chamber to conclude the presentation of the defense case by Octo-
ber 2005.”82 This was perhaps the first indication of concern with the 
expeditious completion of the trial that, by the time of the Accused’s 
death, had become unyielding.83
 
 77. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order Rescheduling and Setting 
the Time Available to Present the Defence Case, para. 10(5) (Feb. 25, 2004), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/order-e/040225.htm. 
 78. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assign-
ment of Defence Counsel, para. 59 (Sept. 22, 2004). 
 79. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order on Future Conduct of the 
Trial, para. 15 (July 6, 2004). 
 80. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order Pursuant to Rule 15 bis (D) 
(Mar. 29, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/order-e/040329.htm 
(deciding to continue the Milosevic proceedings with a substitute judge following Judge 
May’s resignation caused by his illness). 
 81. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order on Future Conduct of the 
Trial, para. 21 (July 6, 2004). 
 82. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Further Order on Future Conduct 
of the Trial, para. 5 (July 19, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/ 
trialc/order-e/040719.htm. However, it later became apparent that the defense case would 
proceed significantly beyond this time. Milosevic, Decision in Relation to Severance, 
Extension of Time and Rest, para. 25 (Dec. 12, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/ 
icty/milosevic/trialc/decision-e/051212.htm (“The conclusion of the Accused’s allotted 
time will take the trial well into March 2006. Once rebuttal and rejoinder cases are heard 
and concluding arguments made, it is likely the trial hearings would still not conclude 
until the middle of 2006. Judgement drafting will occupy a further substantial period.”). 
 83. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Second Order Recording 
Use of Time in the Defence Case (Mar. 23, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/ 
icty/milosevic/trialc/order-e/050323.htm; Milosevic, Order Recording Use of Time Used 
in the Defence case (Mar. 1, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/ 
trialc/order-e/050301-2.htm; Milosevic, Order Concerning the Time Available to Present 
the Defence Case (Feb. 10, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/ 
trialc/order-e/050210.htm (all concerning the limitation of time available to the Defense 
by calculation). 
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In an oral ruling on September 2, 2004, the Trial Chamber ordered the 
assignment of defense counsel to the Accused.84 Accordingly, Mr. Ste-
ven Kay QC and Ms. Gillian Higgins, who previously functioned as 
Amici Curiae, were appointed to this role. The modalities of the assign-
ment were outlined in an order issued on September 3,85 according to 
which it would be the role of the Assigned Counsel “to determine how to 
present the case for the Accused.” 86 In particular, the Assigned Counsel 
were to: 
represent the Accused by preparing and examining those witnesses 
court Assigned Counsel deem it appropriate to call; 
make all submissions on fact and law that they deem it appropriate to 
make; 
seek from the Trial Chamber such orders as they consider necessary to 
enable them to present the Accused’s case properly . . .; [and] 
discuss with the Accused the conduct of the case, endeavour to obtain 
his instructions thereon and take account of views expressed by the Ac-
cused, while retaining the right to determine what course to follow.87
Under this system, it was only with the leave of the Trial Chamber that 
the Accused could “continue to participate actively in the conduct of his 
case, including, where appropriate, examining witnesses, following ex-
amination by court Assigned Counsel.”88 This order whipped the helm 
from the hands of the Accused and installed the newly Assigned Counsel 
in his place, giving them full control over the course of the defense strat-
egy. As will be seen in Section Four, this disproportionate move stripped 
the Accused of his dignity and autonomy. The rationale behind the deci-
sion was expounded upon in a written ruling issued on September 22, 
2004.89 On this occasion, the Chamber extracted a different conclusion 
from an examination of much of the same jurisprudence upon which it 
 
 84. It should be noted that this Article will adopt the term “assignment” as used by 
the Tribunal. This will avoid the negative connotations of the term “imposition” which is 
often used in relation to this case. 
 85. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order on the Modalities to be 
Followed by Court Assigned Counsel, (Sept. 3, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/ 
icty/milosevic/trialc/order-e/040903.htm. 
 86. Id. para. 6(1). 
 87. Id. para. 6(1)(a)–(d). The Tribunal also instructed the Assigned Counsel to “act 
throughout in the best interests of the Accused.” Id. para. 6(1)(e). 
 88. Id. para. 6(2). 
 89. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assign-
ment of Defence Counsel (Sept. 22, 2004). 
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had based its April 2003 ruling. This conclusion is debated in Section 
Three. 
 Following the Accused’s oral instigation, the Assigned Counsel 
lodged an appeal against the assignment that was rejected by the Appeals 
Chamber in November 2004.90 The Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial 
Chamber’s exercise of discretion.91 Crucially, however, the Appeals 
Chamber instructed the Trial Chamber to radically alter the modalities to 
be followed by the Assigned Counsel, according a far greater role to the 
Accused.92 This decision essentially reinstated Milosevic as “captain of 
the ship.”93 The significance of this judgment is expounded in Section 
Four. The Trial Chamber, in December 2004, refused the Assigned 
Counsel’s motion to withdraw,94 and refused leave to appeal this deci-
sion.95 The Registrar’s ensuing refusal to allow the Assigned Counsel to 
withdraw was reaffirmed by the ICTY President in February 2005.96 The 
Assigned Counsel continued, therefore, to function alongside the accused 
until the trial was terminated in March 2006. 
1.3.3: Why Such Haste? 
There is, at present, an unconcealed push for a degree of finality to 
proceedings in The Hague. The Tribunal “was established as a temporary 
tribunal with a finite mission.”97 While this was not clearly articulated in 
the ICTY Statute, it is clear that this was the assumption implied by the 
Report of the Secretary General upon the establishment of the Tribunal, 
whereby “the life span of the international tribunal would be linked to the 
restoration and maintenance of international peace and security in the 
 
 90. Milosevic v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory 
Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defence Counsel (Nov. 1, 
2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/appeal/decision-e/041101.htm. 
 91. Id. paras. 15, 19. 
 92. Id. para. 19. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Assigned Counsel’s 
Motion for Withdrawal (Dec. 7, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/ 
trialc/decision-e/041207.htm. 
 95. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Assigned Counsel 
Request for Certification of an Interlocutory Appeal Against the Decision on Assigned 
Counsel Motion for Withdrawal (Dec. 17, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/ 
milosevic/trialc/decision-e/041217-3.htm. 
 96. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision Affirming the Registrar’s 
Denial of Assigned Counsel’s Application to Withdraw (Feb. 7, 2005), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/decision-e/050207e.htm. 
 97. Dominic Raab, Evaluating the ICTY and Its Completion Strategy: Efforts to 
Achieve Accountability for War Crimes and Their Tribunals, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 82, 84 
(2005). 
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territory of the former Yugoslavia, and Security Council decisions re-
lated thereto.”98 Thus, “concerns have been voiced not only by United 
Nations officials, Member States and others, but also by all the organs of 
the Tribunals with regard to the slowness of the pace of proceedings, the 
associated length of detention of accused, [and] the length and cost of 
Tribunal operations . . . .”99
With proceedings remaining “exceptionally lengthy, costly, and com-
plicated,”100 ambitious strategies had been adopted by the U.N. Security 
Council with a view to hastening the pace of progress.101 The ICTY en-
visaged the completion of “investigations by 2004 . . . first instance trials 
by 2008,”102 and all work in 2010.103 These target deadlines have created 
a palpable concern with the Tribunal’s swift administration of justice, a 
concern which clearly manifested itself in the Milosevic case. 
 
 98. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 
of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), para. 28, delivered to the Security Council, 
U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993). 
 99. U.N. Gen. Assembly, Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the 
Effective Operation and Functioning of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, para. 35, U.N. Doc. 
A/54/634 (Nov. 22, 1999); see also Mark A. Drumbl, Rule of Law Amid Lawlessness: 
Counseling the Accused in Rwanda’s Domestic Genocide Trials, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. 545, 623 (1998) (“Th[e ICTR’s] slowness is perceived as foot-dragging by many 
Rwandans.”); Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic, Justice by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia, 37 STAN. J INT’L L. 255, 309 (2001) (noting that in a survey of 
war victims, the Tribunal’s slow pace emerged as one of the more frequent objections to 
the ICTY); Mary Margaret Penrose, Lest We Fail: The Importance of Enforcement in 
International Criminal Law, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 321, 368 (1999) (footnote omitted) 
(“Th[e ICTY’s] pace is counterproductive to accountability goals, which often focus on 
the swiftness . . . of punishment.”); James Blount Griffin, Note, A Predictive Framework 
for the Effectiveness of International Criminal Tribunals, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
405, 432 (2001) (describing the ICTR to be “too slow for the demands of justice”). 
 100. Nancy Amoury Combs, Copping a Plea to Genocide: The Plea Bargaining of 
International Crimes, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 90 (2002). 
 101. See S.C. Res. 1329, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1329 (Dec. 5, 2000); S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003); see also President of the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Report on the Operation of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, presented to the Secretary-General (May 12, 2000), 
available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/RAP000620e.htm. 
 102. President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Re-
port on the Judicial Status of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia and the Prospects for Referring Certain Cases to National Courts, para. 1, deliv-
ered to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2002/678 (June 19, 2002). 
 103. Id. para. 75. 
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SECTION TWO: BALANCING RIGHTS 
What emerged in the Milosevic conflict between self-representation 
and the principle of a speedy trial was a balancing test between the per-
sonal rights of the Accused and the interest of the tribunal in achieving a 
fair and expeditious trial. The Tribunal ultimately found that the efficient 
administration of justice to prevail in light of the overarching need to 
secure a fair trial. This decision confirms that self-representation is not 
an institutional component of the adversary process, but rather a privi-
lege that can be withdrawn in certain circumstances in the interests of 
fairness and expedition. This section examines the legitimacy of that 
claim. 
2.1: Overarching Right to Fair Trial 
In its decision to assign counsel, the Milosevic Trial Chamber found 
that “[t]he minimum guarantees set out in Article 21(4) of the Statute are 
elements of the overarching requirement of a fair trial.”104 Essentially, 
the Trial Chamber subsumed the right to represent oneself in person into 
a single “right to a defense,” which in turn forms just one of several ele-
ments in the “overarching” right to a fair trial. 
In accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,105 
the Trial Chamber found that “when read in light of the object and pur-
pose of securing [the] . . . right to a . . . fair trial,” the right to represent 
oneself under Article 21(4)(d) “may be lost if the effect of its exercise is 
to obstruct the achievement of that object and purpose.”106 Thus, as ar-
ticulated by Justice Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court in Adams v. 
United States ex rel. McCann, “[w]hat were contrived as protections for 
the accused should not be turned into fetters.”107
This reasoning was heavily inspired by the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR, which considers all minimum rights included in Article 6(3) of 
the ECHR in the context of the overall purpose of bringing about a fair 
 
 104. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assign-
ment of Defence Counsel, para. 32 (Sept. 22, 2004). 
 105. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), done May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. In the early days of the work of the 
ICTY, the Tribunal decided that it was permissible to interpret the ICTY Statute using 
treaty interpretation principles similar to that found in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Con-
vention. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, para. 282 (July 15, 1999), 
available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/judgement/tad-aj990715e.pdf. 
 106. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assign-
ment of Defence Counsel, para. 34 (Sept. 22, 2004). 
 107. 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942). 
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trial.108 Under this premise, the list of minimum guarantees set out in 
Article 6(3) of the ECHR (substantially equivalent to Article 21(4) of the 
ICTY Statute) reflects aspects of the notion of a fair trial.109 Article 
21(4)(d) is not, therefore, simply a list of unconnected guarantees, but 
rather “a compact statement of the rights necessary to a full defense”110 
which must be considered in the broader context of the right to a fair 
 
 108. See, e.g., Meftah v. France, 2002-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 265, 282–83 para. 40, avail-
able at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action= 
html&highlight=Meftah%20%7C%20v.%20%7C%20France&sessionid=11521945&skin
=hudoc-en (“[T]he guarantees contained in paragraph 3 of Article 6 are specific aspects 
of the general concept of a fair trial set forth in paragraph 1.”); Correia de Mateos v. Por-
tugal, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 161, para. 31, available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=1132746FF1FE2
A468ACCBCD1763D4D8149&key=24119&sessionId=8129673&skin=hudoc-
en&attachment=true (“The Court will examine the applicant’s complaint in accordance 
with the general rule set out in paragraph 1 of Article 6 of the Convention, while bearing 
in mind the requirements of paragraph 3(c) of that Article, which constitute particular 
aspects of the right to a fair trial, guaranteed by paragraph 1.” (citation omitted)); X. v. 
Norway, App. No. 5923/72, 3 Eur. Comm’n. H.R. Dec. & Rep. 43, 44 (1975). 
 109. See, e.g., Foucher v. France (No. 33), 1997-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 452, 464 para. 30, 
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&ac-
tion=html&highlight=Foucher%20%7C%20v.%20%7C%20France&sessionid=11521945
&skin=hudoc-en; Delta v. France, 191 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1, 15 para. 34 (1990), avail-
able at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html& 
highlight=Delta%20%7C%20v.%20%7C%20France&sessionid=11522061&skin=hudoc-
en; Granger v. United Kingdom, 174 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17, para. 43 (1990), avail-
able at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table= 
F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=205&sessionId=11522061&skin=h
udoc-en&attachment=true; Unterpertinger v. Austria, 110 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at para. 
29 (1986), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action= 
open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=169&sessionId=11522
046&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true (“[T]he guarantees contained in paragraph 3 (art. 
6-3) are specific aspects of the general concept of a fair trial set forth in paragraph 1 (art. 
6-1) . . . .”); see also Vacher v. France (No. 25), 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2138, 2147 para. 
22 (1996), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1 
&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=Vacher%20%7C%20v.%20%7C%20France&se
ssionid=11522061&skin=hudoc-en Melin v. France, 261 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1, 11 
para. 21 (1993), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1& 
portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=12914/87&sessionid=11520930&skin=hudoc-en 
(both stating that “the requirements of paragraph 3 (b) and (c) of Article 6 of the Conven-
tion . . . constitute specific aspects of the right to a fair trial”). 
 110. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975). Faretta makes this statement with 
regard to the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; the rights guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment and Article 21(4) of the ICTY Statute are substantially similar. Com-
pare U.S. CONST. amend. VI with ICTY Statute art. 21(4), May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192. 
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trial.111 Self-representation is simply a means through which this right 
can be secured.112 Recent jurisprudence of the HRC,113 ECtHR,114 and 
ICTY115 support this premise, as does the U.S. Supreme Court decision 
in Faretta.116
2.2: Fair and Expeditious Trial 
Under Article 21(4)(c) of the ICTY Statute, the accused has the right to 
be tried “without undue delay.”117 Moreover, trial chambers have a duty, 
inter alia, to ensure a “fair and expeditious” trial under Article 20(1).118 
 
 111. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assign-
ment of Defence Counsel, para. 32 (Sept. 22, 2004). 
 112. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Prosecution Response to 
“Assigned Counsel Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision on Assignment of De-
fence Counsel” and to “Defence Reply to ‘Prosecution Motion to Strike Ground of Ap-
peal (3) from Assigned Counsel “Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision on As-
signment of Defence Counsel,’”” para. 25 (Oct. 11, 2004) available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/motion/041011response.htm. 
 113. Torregrosa Lafuente v. Spain, Comm’n No. 866/1999, para. 6.3, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/72/D/866/1999 (Aug. 31, 2001), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/ 
(Symbol)/3e076e74aeabef56c1256ada002edafb?Opendocument (finding that a Spanish 
law requiring a litigant before the Constitutional Court to be represented by counsel did 
not violate Article 14(1) of the ICCPR). 
 114. See, e.g., Correia de Matos v. Portugal, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 161. 
 115. Prosecutor v. Seselj, IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order 
Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with His Defence, paras. 20–21 (May 9, 
2003), available at http://www.un.org/icty/seselj/trialc/decision-e/030509.htm; Prosecu-
tor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on the Alternative Request for Renewed 
Consideration of Delalic’s Motion for an Adjournment Until 22 June or Request for Issue 
of Subpoenas to Individuals and Requests for Assistance to the Government of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, para. 44 (June 22, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/ 
trialc2/decision-e/80622MS25747.htm (stating that the exercise of the rights enjoyed by 
the accused “is not absolute” and “is subject to the control of the Trial Chamber to ensure 
a fair and expeditious trial in the interests of justice”). 
 116. Hybrid Defense, supra note 26, at 351. 
 117. ICTY Statute, supra note 12, art. 21(4)(c) (emphasis added); see also ICTR Stat-
ute, supra note 13, art. 20(4)(c); Statute of the SCSL, supra note 14, art. 17(4)(c); Rome 
Statute, supra note 15, art. 67(1)(c); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. 
on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, The Administration of Justice and 
the Human Rights of Detainees: The Right to a Fair Trial: Current Recognition and 
Measures Necessary for its Strengthening, Annex II: Draft Body of Principles on the 
Right to a Fair Trial and a Remedy, para. 54, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/24 (June 3, 
1994) (prepared by Stanislav Chernichenko & William Treat). 
 118. ICTY Statute, supra note 12, art. 20(1) (emphasis added); see also ICTR Statute, 
supra note 13, art. 19(1) (“The Trial Chambers shall ensure that a trial is fair and expedi-
tious and that proceedings are conducted in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, with full respect for the rights of the accused . . . .”); Rules of Procedure and 
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Article 20(1) does not simply concern the accused, but rather imposes a 
positive duty on the trial chamber in the public interest.119 The com-
monly cited principle of speedy trial refers to a combination of these 
three guarantees, and entails consideration of a diverse range of interests. 
The trial chambers must, therefore, in balancing various rights with the 
principle of a fair and expeditious trial, have due regard for interests 
other than those of the accused. 
2.2.1: In Whose Interest Is a Speedy Trial? 
It is primarily the accused who has an interest in a speedy trial. Prompt 
trials go some way to ensuring that the defendant can mount an effective 
defense. Speedy trials are primarily designed “(i) to prevent oppressive 
pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the ac-
cused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be im-
paired.”120 Prompt trials ensure that witnesses’ memories do not fade121 
and evidence is not destroyed nor disappears.122 The limitation of pretrial 
detention is particularly important at the Yugoslavia Tribunal, where 
many defendants are held for lengthy periods before trial due to, inter 
alia, the Tribunal’s overwhelming caseload.123
The interests of the Prosecution, victims, and witnesses must also be 
considered,124 along with those of unrelated defendants awaiting trial125 
 
Evidence of the SCSL, Rule 26 bis (as amended Mar. 7, 2003) (similar language); Rome 
Statute, supra note 15, art. 64(2) (similar language). 
 119. ICTY Statute, supra note 12, art. 20(1) (“The Trial Chambers shall ensure that a 
trial is fair and expeditious and that proceedings are conducted in accordance with the 
rules of procedure and evidence, with full respect for the rights of the accused and due 
regard for the protection of victims and witnesses.” (emphasis added)). 
 120. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972) (footnote omitted); see also Amnesty 
Int’l, Fair Trials Manual, ch. 19.1, AI Index: POL 30/002/98, Dec. 1, 1998. 
 121. See Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision, para. 105, 
(Nov. 3, 1999) (quoting unidentified source). 
 122. Akhil Reed Amar, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST 
PRINCIPLES 90 (1997) (“[I]f government holds the accused in extended pretrial detention, 
courts must ensure that the accuracy of the trial itself will not thereby be undermined—as 
might occur if an innocent defendant’s prolonged detention itself causes the loss of key 
exculpatory evidence.”). 
 123. Patrick L. Robinson, Ensuring Fair and Expeditious Trials at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 11 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 569, 585 (2000). 
 124. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion Re-
questing Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, para. 55 (Aug. 10, 1995), avail-
able at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/decision-e/100895pm.htm (“A fair trial 
means not only fair treatment to the defendant but also to the prosecution and to the wit-
nesses.”); see also Dietrich v. The Queen (1992) 177 C.L.R. 292, 335 (Deane, J.) (Austl.) 
(stating that “‘the interests of the Crown acting on behalf of the community’” must be 
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and the international community.126 In an enlightening dissent in Mil-
osevic, Judge Shahabuddeen posited that: 
The fairness of a trial is the result of the fairness of the system of jus-
tice employed. The latter depends on the striking of a balance between 
two competing public interests. First, there is the justly publicized pub-
lic interest in respecting the rights of the accused. Second, there is the 
less proclaimed but equal public interest in ensuring that crimes are 
properly investigated and duly prosecuted.127
It was recognized in Milosevic that “the Tribunal has its own distinct 
set of interests at stake in this case, including first and foremost the inter-
est in an outcome that is just, accurate, and reasonably expeditious.”128 
This premise has consistently been reiterated by the Trial Chamber129 
 
considered in “determining the practical content” of the right to a fair trial (quoting Bar-
ton v. The Queen (1980) 147 C.L.R. 75, 101 (Austl.) (Gibbs, A.C.J. & Mason, J.))). 
 125. Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, Case No. ICTR-98-42-T, Decision in the Matter of 
Proceedings Under Rule 15 bis (D), para. 33(g) (July 15, 2003). 
 126. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1 (Appeals Chamber), Decision on 
Prosecutor’s Appeal on Admissiblity of Evidence, para. 25 (Feb. 16, 1999), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/aleksovski/appeal/decision-e/90216EV36313.htm (“[T]he Prose-
cution acts on behalf of and in the interests of the community, including the interests of 
the victims of the offence charged (in cases before the Tribunal the Prosecutor acts on 
behalf of the international community).”). 
 127. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.2, Decision on Admissibility 
of Prosecution Investigator’s Evidence, Partial Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabud-
deen, para. 36 (Sept. 30, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/appeal/ 
decision-e/020930par.htm.htm. 
 128. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision Affirming the Registrar’s 
Denial of Assigned Counsel’s Application to Withdraw, para. 11 (Feb. 7, 2005) (footnote 
omitted) (emphasis added); see also Milosevic, Trial Tr. at 32358:12–19 (Sept. 2, 2004), 
available at http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/040902IT.htm (“The fundamental duty of 
the Trial Chamber is to ensure that the trial is fair and expeditious.”). 
 129. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on Request by Accused 
Mucic for Assignment of New Counsel, para. 3 (June 24, 1996), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/decision-e/60624DS2.htm (emphasizing the 
“overriding interest of the administration of justice” and that the Tribunal had to “be sat-
isfied that the reasons [for the defendant’s dissatisfaction with assigned counsel] are 
genuine and that the request [for assignment of new counsel] is not being made for frivo-
lous reasons or in a desire to pervert the course of justice, e.g., by causing additional de-
lay”); Prosecutor v. Seselj, IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order 
Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with His Defence, para. 21 (May 9, 2003). 
The Seselj Tribunal also stated that “the right to a fair trial . . . is not only a fundamental 
right of the Accused, but also a fundamental interest of the Tribunal related to its own 
legitimacy.” Id. 
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and the Appeals Chamber,130 by other tribunals,131 and in national juris-
dictions.132 In sum, the Tribunal has a legitimate interest in ensuring that 
justice is being done and seen to be done. 
2.2.2: The Fair Trial Rights of the Accused Remain Paramount 
While the principle of a speedy trial necessarily encompasses diverse 
interests, it is particularly instructive that under Article 20(1) of the 
ICTY Statute a fair and expeditious trial must be achieved “with full re-
spect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of 
victims and witnesses.”133 This formulation suggests that the interests of 
the accused must be given precedence. A further indication of the pri-
macy of the interests of the accused is found in the assertion made in the 
ICTR case Kanyabashi that the “object and purpose” of the ICTR Statute 
is to secure for the accused “a fair and expeditious trial.”134 According to 
Falvey, “[t]he protection of victims and witnesses, although a laudable 
goal, must yield to the right to a fair trial when the two conflict.”135
 
 130. Milosevic v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory 
Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defence Counsel, para. 19 
(Nov. 1, 2004) (noting “the Tribunal’s basic interest in a reasonably expeditious resolu-
tion of the cases before it”). 
 131. See Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Decision on the Application 
of Samuel Hinga Norman for Self Representation under Article 17(4)(d) of the Statute of 
the Special Court, para. 26 (June 8, 2004) (considering “the public interest, national and 
international, in the expeditious completion of the trial” in determining whether to allow 
the accused to represent himself). 
 132. It has, for instance, consistently been reaffirmed by the High Court of Australia 
that when “determining the practical content” of the right to a fair trial, “‘regard must be 
had to the interests of the Crown acting on behalf of the community as well as to the in-
terests of the accused.’” Dietrich v. The Queen (1992) 177 C.L.R. 292, 335 (Deane, J.) 
(quoting Barton v. The Queen (1980) 147 C.L.R. 75, 101 (Austl.) (Gibbs, A.C.J. & Ma-
son, J.)). Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court felt that the right of a defendant to be present 
at trial must be held to be subordinate to the overriding need to maintain orderly and dig-
nified proceedings, which is “essential to the proper administration of criminal justice.” 
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970). 
 133. ICTY Statute, supra note 12, art. 20(1) (emphasis added). 
 134. Kanyabashi v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-15-A, Decision on the Defence 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on the Jurisdiction of Trial Chamber I, Joint and Sepa-
rate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, para. 16 (June 3, 1999). 
 135. Joseph L. Falvey, Jr., United Nations Justice or Military Justice: Which is the 
Oxymoron? An Analysis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 475, 487 (1995). Mr. Falvey 
assisted in the drafting of the rules of evidence and procedure proposed by the United 
States for the ICTY. Id. at 475; see also Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, Case No. ICTR-
97-21-I, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion for Joinder of Trials, para. 16 (Oct. 5, 
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The ECtHR has held that Article 6(1) of the ECHR, equivalent to Arti-
cle 20(1) of the ICTY Statute, “is intended above all to secure the inter-
ests of the defence and those of the proper administration of justice.”136 
Furthermore, the ECtHR has held that “[t]he right to a fair administration 
of justice . . . cannot be sacrificed to expediency.”137 Hence, the safe-
guards accorded to the accused should not be excessively curtailed in the 
interest of achieving a speedy conclusion at trial. 
The ICTY Rules provide little guidance on which rights take prece-
dence in the event of a conflict between them. This problem will become 
more pronounced, given the elevated status of victims and witnesses in 
the Rome Statute138 and recent pronouncements of the ECtHR that ap-
pear to accord new rights to victims.139 It is instructive that Article 68(1) 
of the Rome Statute dictates that measures taken to protect victims and 
witnesses “shall not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the 
accused or a fair and impartial trial.”140 This formulation again appears 
to give precedence to the rights of the accused. These authorities must be 
given due weight in the balancing of rights. 
The Trial Chamber’s original approach of allowing Milosevic to pro-
ceed pro se indisputably exacerbated the already lengthy nature of that 
trial.141 In response, the Chamber had to balance the pro se right of the 
accused with its own statutory duty to secure a fair and expeditious trial. 
The following section will address the manner in which the Chamber 
balanced these rights. It is not denied that the Chamber indeed had a 
genuine and legitimate interest in curtailing the pro se right of the Ac-
cused. Rather, it is argued that the Chamber erred in the principles em-
ployed to achieve this goal. 
 
1999) (“[T]he need to protect victims and witnesses . . . cannot be entirely subordinated 
to the rights of the accused.”). 
 136. Acquaviva v. France, 333 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 17, para. 66 (1996) (emphasis 
added). 
 137. Kostovski v. Netherlands, 166 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 21, para. 44 (1989). 
 138. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 68 (containing provisions for the pro-
tection of victims and witnesses). 
 139. See, e.g., M.C. v. Bulgaria, 2003-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 37–38, paras. 177–78. Here, 
the ECtHR appears to accord a right of a (rape) victim to compel investigators and prose-
cutors to confront witnesses in order to assess the credibility of conflicting evidence.  
 140. Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 68(1); see also id. art. 68(3), 68(5) (containing 
same provision with respect to specific protective measures). 
 141. It is important to note that a trial’s length depends on many factors, “including the 
scope of the indictment, the breadth of the dispute between the parties and the complexity 
of the facts.” Richard May & Marieke Wierda, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 279 
(2002). 
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SECTION THREE: MILOSEVIC AND THE ASSIGNMENT OF COUNSEL 
As demonstrated by the foregoing, it has been clearly established that 
adjudicative bodies have the power to restrict the right to self-
representation in the interest of the fair and expeditious administration of 
justice. Upon this foundation, it is widely accepted that a defendant’s pro 
se right may be restricted in the case of deliberate trial disruption, to 
which the author will refer as “obstructionism.” This principle is based 
on the rationale that self-representation may not be used as a tactic to 
delay the trial. By necessity, the employment of tactics implies the exis-
tence of resolve, volition, and intention. Thus, the concept of obstruction-
ism may be said to relate solely to the willful conduct of the accused de-
liberately aimed at the disruption of trial proceedings. It follows that this 
concept does not encompass disruption caused by unintended or extrane-
ous factors. 
Controversially, the Trial Chamber ruled in Milosevic that “[t]here is 
no difference in principle between deliberate misconduct which disrupts 
the proceedings and any other circumstance which so disrupts the pro-
ceedings as to threaten the integrity of the trial.”142 This reasoning effec-
tively led to the conclusion that delays accruing due to the Accused’s ill 
health had the same potential as a defendant’s deliberately obstructionist 
actions to damage the integrity of proceedings. In other words, the dam-
age that disruption causes to the integrity of a trial will be the same re-
gardless of the cause or purpose of that disruption. This assertion will be 
challenged in this section. 
It is contended that while the recurring ill health of Milosevic undenia-
bly inhibited the expeditious completion of the trial, it cannot be said to 
have undermined the integrity of proceedings. Ill health must be differen-
tiated from deliberate obstructionist behavior. The following section out-
lines why the decision to assign counsel could not defensibly have been 
based on the principle of obstructionism, thereby leading the Trial 
Chamber to avoid this rubric, and to create an entirely new and un-
founded premise in law in order to fulfill the aims of the completion 
strategy. 
3.1: Intentional Disruption: “Obstructionism” 
The concept of obstructionism is derived from the fact that the “pro se 
right is circumscribed by the requirement that the defendant not disregard 
 
 142. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assign-
ment of Defence Counsel, para. 33 (Sept. 22, 2004). 
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the dignity, order and decorum of judicial proceedings.”143 In the seminal 
case of Faretta v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that 
the right to proceed pro se may be denied where the defendant deliber-
ately undertakes to hinder the trial’s orderly conduct by engaging in ob-
streperous behavior.144 This was based on the premise that the right to 
self-representation was not intended as a license either “to abuse the dig-
nity of the courtroom”145 or to ignore either the rules of procedure or 
substantive law.146 This case clearly sought to regulate voluntary mis-
conduct specifically designed to interrupt proceedings.147 Nowhere does 
Faretta imply that a defendant may lose his pro se right if he uninten-
tionally consumes too much time in exercising it. 
It is imperative that international legal proceedings are seen to be con-
ducted efficiently, and with dignity and decorum.148 In other words, “jus-
tice must satisfy the appearance of justice.”149 Disruptions, particularly 
where intentional, inevitably damage the public perception of the Tribu-
nal. Accordingly, “the interest of a court in stopping disruption of its 
 
 143. Memorandum of Law Regarding Defendant’s Motion to Proceed Pro Se and 
Status of Counsel at 11 n.19, United States v. Moussaoui, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11135 
(E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 01-455-A) (citations omitted), available at 
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/65824/0.pdf 
 144. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975) (“[T]he trial judge may ter-
minate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and ob-
structionist misconduct.” (citation omitted)). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id.; see also Ramirez Ferrel v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 576 P.2d 
93, 95 (Cal. 1978) (noting that, as supported by Faretta, “an accused should only be de-
prived of th[e] right [of self-representation] when he engages in disruptive in-court con-
duct which is inconsistent with its proper exercise”). 
 147. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46 (“[T]he right [to self-representation] does not 
exist . . . to be used as a tactic for . . . disruption . . . .”); see also United States v. Eg-
waoje, 335 F.3d 579, 586 (7th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the fact that the accused “en-
gaged in a pattern of obfuscation and obstructionism” supported the “knowing and intel-
ligent” nature of his waiver of the right to counsel). The connotations of the word “obfus-
cation” in this context clearly indicate that the conduct to which the exception applies 
involves control and resolve. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970); Common-
wealth v. Africa, 353 A.2d 855, 864 (Pa. 1976). 
 148. See Memorandum of Law Regarding Defendant’s Motion to Proceed Pro Se and 
Status of Counsel at 11 n.19, United States v. Moussaoui, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11135 
(E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 01-455-A) (“[T]he defendant’s pro se right is circumscribed by the 
requirement that the defendant does not disregard the dignity, order and decorum of judi-
cial proceedings.” (citations omitted)). 
 149. Offutt v. U.S. 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954). 
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proceedings, and the consequent threat to the integrity of the trial, is a 
component of the overarching right to a fair trial.”150
In Seselj, the Tribunal advanced the “legitimate interest in ensuring 
that the trial proceeds in a timely manner without interruptions, adjourn-
ments or disruptions” to justify the assignment of standby counsel.151 
This interest was reaffirmed in Delalic.152 In Prlic, the Tribunal stated 
that “it is the duty of the Trial Chamber to make sure that the proceed-
ings would not be halted by foreseeable, and therefore avoidable, 
risks.”153 Likewise, in the SCSL case of Norman, the great potential for 
further disruption to the court’s timetable and calendar was among the 
factors the court considered relevant to the curtailment of the right to 
self-representation.154
Furthermore, in Croissant v. Germany, the ECtHR found that “avoid-
ing interruptions or adjournments corresponds to an interest of justice 
which is relevant in the present context and may well justify an appoint-
ment against the accused’s wishes.”155 This principle is also recognized 
by U.S. courts which have denied applications “to proceed pro se be-
 
 150. Milosevic v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Prosecution Response to 
“Assigned Counsel Appeal Against Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of De-
fence Counsel” and “Defence Reply to “Prosecution Motion to Strike Ground of Appeal 
(3) from Assigned Counsel “Appeal Against Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assign-
ment of Defence Counsel,”’” n.98 (Oct. 11, 2004).  
 151. Prosecutor v. Seselj, IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order 
Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with His Defence, para. 21 (May 9, 2003). 
 152. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on the Alternative Request 
for Renewed Consideration of Delalic’s Motion for an Adjournment Until 22 June or 
Request for Issue of Subpoenas to Individuals and Requests for Assistance to the Gov-
ernment of Bosnia and Herzegovina, paras. 44–45 (June 22, 1998) (noting that the exer-
cise of the rights contained in Article 21(4) “is subject to the control of the Trial Chamber 
to ensure a fair and expeditious trial in the interests of justice” and declaring that “the 
Trial Chamber is, in the interests of expeditious and fair trial, empowered to order the 
accused to close his case”). 
 153. Prosecutor v. Prlic, Case No. IT-04-74-PT, Decision on Requests for Appoint-
ment of Counsel, para. 31 (July 30, 2004) (citing Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic, Case No. 
IT-01-47-PT, Decision on the Prosecution’s Motion for Review of the Decision of the 
Registrar to Assign Mr. Rodney Dixon as Co-Counsel to the Accused Kubura, para. 44–
45 (Mar. 26, 2002),(noting that “the Chamber cannot wait until foreseeable harm is done 
to the proceedings. It is for the Chamber to prevent such foreseeable harm.”)). 
 154. Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Decision on the Application of 
Samuel Hinga Norman for Self Representation Under Article 17(4)(d) of the Statute of 
the Special Court, paras. 15–16 (June 8, 2004). The SCSL further considered that the 
Trial Chamber has a special interest in “protect[ing] the integrity of [its] proceedings” 
and “ensur[ing] that the administration of justice is not brought into disrepute.” Id. para. 
28. 
 155. Croissant v. F.R.G., 237 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 20, para. 28 (1992). 
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cause of concern for orderly process.”156 Further justifications for deny-
ing a pro se request have included “the need to ‘minimize disruptions, to 
avoid inconvenience and delay, [and] to maintain continuity.’”157  
3.1.1: The Willful Nature of Obstructionism 
An ICTY Trial Chamber in Delalic confirmed the willful nature of ob-
structionism, noting that self-representation may be curtailed where an 
accused “unreasonably and unilaterally chooses his own dates in such a 
manner as to prejudicially affect the course of the proceedings and cause 
delay in respect of the defence of other accused persons.”158 This conclu-
sion was primarily inspired by the possibility that “an accused . . . may 
by devious reasons relying on Article 21(4)(e) prolong the trial unneces-
sarily.”159 As in Faretta, the rationale underpinning this decision pertains 
solely to voluntary misconduct. 
In a dissenting opinion in Seselj, Judge Antonetti stated that a mere in-
tention to obstruct proceedings is insufficient to justify the curtailment of 
the right to self-representation.160 In order to warrant the appointment of 
counsel, the Tribunal must demonstrate deliberately obstructionist behav-
ior161 or indisputably extreme conduct by the defendant which, by its 
 
 156. Colquitt, supra note 36, at 64 (citing Sapienza v. Vincent, 534 F.2d 1007, 1010 
(2d Cir. 1976); People v. Anderson, 247 N.W.2d 857, 860 (Mich. 1976)). 
 157. Id. at 65 (quoting United States v. Dunlap, 577 F.2d 867, 868 (4th Cir. 1978)); see 
also Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 161–62 (2000) (“[T]he govern-
ment’s interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the 
defendant’s interest in acting as his own lawyer.”). 
 158. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on the Alternative Request 
for Renewed Consideration of Delalic’s Motion for an Adjournment Until 22 June or 
Request for Issue of Subpoenas to Individuals and Requests for Assistance to the Gov-
ernment of Bosnia and Herzegovina, para. 45 (June 22, 1998). 
 159. Id. Based on these reasons, the Delalic Tribunal ordered the pro se Accused to 
close his case. Id. para. 48. 
 160. Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on the Accused’s Motion to 
Re-Examine the Decision to Assign Standby Counsel, Opinion Dissidente du Judge An-
tonetti [Dissenting Opinion of Judge Antonetti], para. 10 (Mar. 1, 2005) (“La Chambre ne 
peut pas . . . limiter le droit de l’Accusé à assurer personnellement sa défense en se fon-
dant sur des « intentions » obstructionnistes.” [“The Chamber may not limit . . . the right 
of the Defendant to personally ensure his defense because it is based on obstructionist 
intentions.” ] (translation by Brooklyn Journal of International Law)). 
 161. Id. (noting that the Tribunal “a le devoir de démontrer que le comportement de 
l’accusé est constitutif d’une faute témoignant d’un comportement délibérément grave et 
obstructionniste” [“has the duty to show that the behavior of the defendant constitutes an 
offense demonstrating deliberately serious and obstructionist conduct”] (translation by 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law)). 
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very nature, encumbers the administration of justice.162 Clearly, there-
fore, in order to constitute obstructionism, disruption must be derived 
from voluntary misconduct. 
The Appeals Chamber in Milosevic found it “particularly instruc-
tive”163 to consider the right of an accused “to be tried in his [own] pres-
ence.”164 Rule 80(B) of the ICTY Rules allows a Trial Chamber to “or-
der the removal of an accused from the courtroom and continue the pro-
ceedings in the absence of the accused if the accused has persisted in dis-
ruptive conduct.”165 Here, again, it is voluntary misconduct which trig-
gers the curtailment of the minimum guarantees set out in Article 
21(4)(d). 
3.1.2: Was Milosevic an Obstructionist? 
The Milosevic Trial Chamber explicitly acknowledged that the Ac-
cused’s conduct at trial did not constitute obstructionism.166 The Prose-
cution also overtly accepted this fact.167 In order to understand Mil-
osevic’s conduct, it is first necessary to comprehend his defense strategy. 
Milosevic clearly viewed himself as a “political” defendant, attempting 
to convert his trial into a trial of NATO and the Clinton Administration, 
which, he claimed, cooperated with “terrorists” in Kosovo in 1999.168 
 
 162. Id. (noting that the Tribunal must establish “un comportement manifestement 
excessif de nature à entraver la bonne administration de la justice” [“conduct so mani-
festly excessive the nature of which is likely to hinder the proper administration of jus-
tice”] (translation by Brooklyn Journal of International Law)). 
 163. Milosevic v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory 
Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, para. 13 
(Nov. 1, 2004). 
 164. Id.; see ICTY Statute, supra note 12, art. 21(4)(d). 
 165. Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia rule 80(B), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 37 (1996), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/basic/rpe/IT032Rev37e.pdf. 
 166. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Reasons for Decision on the Prosecution Motion Con-
cerning Assignment of Counsel, para. 40 (Apr. 4, 2003). 
 167. Prosecutor v. Seselj, IT-03-67-PT, Prosecution’s Motion for Order Appointing 
Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with his Defence, at para. 11 (Feb. 28, 2003) (“As a 
former head of state, the accused Milosevic does not need to be disruptive, obstructionist 
or scandalous in order to remain in the public’s eye. Therefore, despite his rejection of 
the Tribunal and its authority as such, to date the accused Milosevic has, to a large extent, 
taken part in the proceedings in an orderly fashion.”) (on file with the author). 
 168. Sophia Piliouras, U.N. Report, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia and Milosevic’s Trial, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 515, 520–21 (2002) (al-
leging, inter alia, that the United States provided “close air support to the Kosovo Libera-
tion Army and other Albanian ‘terrorists’ and their foreign Islamic allies,” that NATO 
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Among other allegations,169 Milosevic accused the ICTY of “victor’s 
justice.”170 Milosevic claimed that the Tribunal yields to the objectives 
of the U.S. and other NATO powers,171 countries without whose finan-
cial and military support the tribunal could not function.172 Essentially, 
he chose self-representation as the most effective means of defending the 
actions of the Serbian nation and his own political record. 
Commentators have noted that Milosevic was derisive on certain occa-
sions during the trial proceedings.173 This, however, is inherent in the 
primarily adversarial nature of the trial proceedings. It also ignores the 
sensitive manner in which the Accused dealt with alleged victims of sex-
ual assault. Accusations that the Accused refused to focus on material 
considered relevant to the indictment174 fail to examine the role of the 
Trial Chamber in regulating the presentation of the evidence, and the 
efforts of the Accused to present indictment-relevant evidence, particu-
larly relating to Kosovo, during the Defense stage. 
Although the Accused did not personally file written submissions and 
at times failed to state his position on procedural points,175 he effectively 
 
acted “as an ‘unlawful aggressor,’” and that certain officials of NATO countries were 
involved in “a ‘joint criminal enterprise’ against Yugoslavia and Serbia”). 
 169. Among other factors challenged by Milosevic were the composition of the bench, 
the manner of his surrender to the Tribunal, the timing of his indictment, and the unfair-
ness of procedures at the Tribunal. Michael P. Scharf, The Legacy of the Milosevic Trial, 
37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 915, 923–30 (2003). 
 170. See Gary J. Bass, Why Not Victor’s Justice?, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2002, at A33. 
 171. See id. 
 172. See, e.g., Madeleine K. Albright, We Won’t Let War Criminals Walk; With or 
Without a Balkan Peace Deal, the U.S. Won’t Relent, WASH. POST, Nov. 19 1995, at C01 
(noting that the U.S. had given “more than $13 million in direct contributions and as-
sessments” to the Tribunal). 
 173. See, e.g., Scharf, supra note 169, at 919 (“In addition to regularly making dispar-
aging remarks about the court and repeatedly brow-beating witnesses, Milosevic pontifi-
cate[d] at length during cross examination of every prosecution witness.”). 
 174. See, e.g., Trial Tr. at 3264:15–17 (Apr. 17, 2002), Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case 
No. IT-02-54-T, available at http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/020417IT.htm (May, J.) 
(“It is an abuse of the process for you to make speeches, Mr. Milosevic, at this stage. It’s 
also an abuse to go over the same ground.”); id. at 6208:8–10 (June 4, 2002), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/020604ED.htm (May, J.) (“A great deal of time is taken 
up with repetition and argument and sometimes irrelevancies.”). 
 175. See, e.g., id. at 32078:3–4 (Mar. 25, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/ 
transe54/040325MH.htm (Milosevic: “Of course I have no intention of declaring my 
views on your administrative issues.”); id. at 32078:9–13 (Meron, J.) (“I am assuming 
that I should derive the conclusion from your comment that you do not wish to grant a 
consent to the continuation of the hearings as I cannot understand the comment you have 
made as amounting to a clear and unequivocal consent to continue the proceedings with a 
substitute Judge.”). 
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waived his right to file by implicitly accepting the work of Assigned 
Counsel. The Accused essentially prompted them to make such submis-
sions on his behalf through oral submissions at trial.176 He went so far as 
to explicitly acknowledge the dedication and commitment of Assigned 
Counsel.177 However, it is evident from the litigation concerning provi-
sional release that he gave explicit and direct instructions to Assigned 
Counsel from December 2005 to the time of his death.178 Furthermore, 
Milosevic “fully engaged in the cross-examination of Prosecution wit-
nesses”179 and presented consecutive witnesses in his defense,180 thereby 
actively partaking in trial proceedings. 
3.1.3: Threshold of Obstructionist Conduct 
The high threshold that a defendant’s conduct must breach in order to 
constitute obstructionism is manifest from the ICTR case of Barayag-
wiza.181 The Accused, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, declared the Rwanda 
Tribunal to be “so dependent on the dictatorial anti-Hutu regime of Ki-
gali” that it could not render “independent and impartial justice.”182 He 
 
 176. E.g., Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Assigned Coun-
sel Request for Provisional Release, para. 2 (Feb. 23, 2006); Prosecutor v. Milosevic, 
Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision on Assign-
ment of Defence Counsel: Corrigendum, para. 32 (Sept. 29, 2004), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/motion/040929.htm. 
 177. See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Transcript of Record at 
46690:10–16 (Judge Robinson: “Mr. Milosevic, that, again, is a matter in relation to 
which you owe a great debt of gratitude to assigned counsel. Through their action, 
through their professionalism, we are considering now a motion to subpoena certain wit-
nesses, and without their intervention, without their help, we would not have been con-
sidering this.” The Accused: “Yes, I know about that. I know about that, Mr. Robin-
son.”). 
 178. E.g., Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Assigned Coun-
sel Request for Provisional Release, para. 2 (Feb. 23, 2006) (indicating that the Accused 
first requested provisional release orally, which was then followed by Assigned Coun-
sel’s formal written Request for Provisional Release Pursuant to Rule 65). 
 179. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Prosecution Response to 
“Assigned Counsel Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision on Assignment of De-
fence Counsel” and to “Defence Reply to ‘Prosecution Motion to Strike Ground of Ap-
peal (3) from Assigned Counsel “Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision on As-
signment of Defence Counsel,”’” para. 90 n.144 (Oct. 11, 2004). 
 180. E.g., Trial Tr. at 34851:9–10 (Jan. 11, 2005), Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. 
IT-02-54-T, available at http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/050111IT.htm. 
 181. Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19. 
 182. Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-T, Decision on Defence Coun-
sel Motion to Withdraw, para. 5 (Nov. 2, 2000) (quoting Letter from Jean-Bosco Baray-
agwiza to the Trial Chamber (Oct. 24, 2000)), available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/ 
cases/Barayagwiza/decisions/021100.htm. 
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stated that the Tribunal was committing “a mockery of justice”183 and 
instructed his counsel not to represent him in any way.184 Likewise, Mil-
osevic contested the legitimacy of the ICTY, accusing the Tribunal of 
being “not [a] juridical institution” but rather “a political tool.”185 How-
ever, parallels between the two cases end there; the voluntarily disruptive 
conduct of Barayagwiza breached a threshold which Milosevic did not 
aspire to reach. Barayagwiza refused to attend proceedings, thereby ap-
parently “boycotting” the tribunal.186 As a result of Barayagwiza’s in-
structing his lawyers not to represent him, his lawyers remained passive 
and did not mount an active defense.187 Additionally, Barayagwiza did 
not assert his right to self-representation.188
By contrast, to quote the prosecution, “despite his rejection of the tri-
bunal and its authority as such . . . the accused Milosevic has, to a large 
extent, taken part in the proceedings in an orderly fashion.”189 The Mil-
osevic Trial Chamber explicitly distinguished the conduct of the former 
President from that of Barayagwiza, noting that “[n]o such circumstances 
have, as yet, arisen in this trial.”190 Thus, although certain aspects of the 
behavior of Milosevic may parallel the conduct of the ICTR-accused, the 
primary source of the obstructionism in the Barayagwiza case, i.e., the 
refusal of the accused to attend court, was absent in the case of the for-
mer President. 
The conduct of ICTY-accused Seselj provides a further example of the 
high threshold an accused must breach in order to constitute obstruction-
ism. Vojislav Seselj, representing himself, has consistently derogated 
from the issues at hand191 and refused to follow the procedural rules of 
 
 183. Id. para. 12. 
 184. Id. para. 11 (citing Letter from Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza to the Trial Chamber 
(Oct. 23, 2000)). 
 185. See Trial Tr. at 25:1–2 (Aug. 30, 2001), Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-
54-T, available at http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/010830SC.htm. 
 186. Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-T, Decision on Defence Coun-
sel Motion to Withdraw, para. 16 (Nov. 2, 2000). 
 187. Id. para. 17. 
 188. Id., Concurring and Separate Opinion of Judge Gunawardana, para. 3. 
 189. Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Prosecution’s Motion for Order Ap-
pointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with his Defence, para. 11 (Feb. 28, 2003) (on 
file with the author). 
 190. Id. para. 40. 
 191. E.g., Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Mo-
tion for Order Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with his Defence, para. 7 
(May 9, 2003) (“The Accused devoted only thirteen pages of his ninety-three page ‘Reply 
to the Prosecutor’s Motion to impose defence counsel on me against my will’ . . . to the 
concrete legal question actually at issue.”). The Tribunal classified the remainder as 
“frivolous abuse of the Tribunal’s Translation Unit.” Id. para. 7 n.7. 
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the ICTY.192 Seselj consistently filed handwritten, “excessively long,” 
and “largely irrelevant” motions.193 He publicly expressed his intent to 
cause harm to, or indeed to “attack”194 and “destroy” the Tribunal,195 and 
to use the proceedings to promote Serb national interests rather than as a 
means to defend himself against the charges alleged against him.196 Fur-
thermore, he refused to use a laptop or typewriter as “he was ‘afraid of 
receiving an electric shock,’”197 and repeatedly insisted that he only un-
derstands the Serbian language despite the fact that Croatian is simply a 
variant of that language and evidence showed that he understands Eng-
 
 192. Id. para. 23 (noting that, inter alia, the Accused “submitted a hand written petition 
directly to the Appeals Chamber” knowing that this violated the Rules, that a self-
described “legal adviser” to the accused submitted a letter to the Registrar 
“[un]accompanied by the necessary power of attorney” and who apparently did not meet 
the requirement that counsel speak one of the working languages of the Tribunal, and that 
the accused, in a petition, made “frivolous demands framed in language inappropriate for 
a legal document”). 
 193. Id. 
 194. In a 1994 interview for the French film “Crimes et Criminels,” when he was 
asked what would be his defense in the event of a case being taken against him at the 
ICTY, the Accused responded: “I am not planning to defend myself, I can only attack.” 
Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Prosecution’s Motion for Order Appointing 
Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with his Defence (Feb. 28, 2003) (on file with the au-
thor). He also said: “Personally, I do not recognise this Hague Tribunal. I think it has no 
legal foundation, but if I am ever invited to The Hague I’ll gladly go there immediately. I 
would never miss such a show.” Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on 
Prosecution’s Motion for Order Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with his 
Defence, para. 4 n. 5 (May 9, 2003). Furthermore, at a public rally on the evening before 
he left Belgrade for The Hague, the accused Seselj said “that he would put ‘the Ameri-
cans, the Hague tribunal and NATO’ on trial.” Sofia Hilden, Serb Hardliner Seselj Ar-
rives in Hague, REUTERS, Feb. 24, 2003. The Accused also made the following com-
ments: “With their stupid charges against me they have come up against the greatest liv-
ing legal Serb mind . . . . I shall blast them to pieces.” Seselj Dismisses Hague Indictment, 
ONASA NEWS AGENCY, Feb. 17, 2003. 
 195. On February 3, 2003, the news agency Deutsche Presse Agentur reported that the 
Accused was “reported to have said that ‘he would gladly travel to The Hague to ‘de-
stroy’ the . . . tribunal in case it open[ed] a trial against him.’” Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case 
No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order Appointing Counsel to 
Assist Vojislav Seselj with his Defence, para. 4 n. 5 (May 9, 2003) (quoting DEUTSCHE 
PRESSE-AGENTUR, Feb. 3, 2003). 
 196. See Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Prosecution’s Motion for Order 
Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with his Defence, para. 1 (Feb. 28, 2003) 
(on file with the author). 
 197. Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Trial Tr. at 66, available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/transe67/030325SC.htm; Seselj, Decision on Prosecution’s Mo-
tion for Order Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with his Defence, para. 23 
(May 9, 2003). 
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lish.198 The trial chamber found the foregoing “attitude and actions . . . 
indicative of obstructionism on [Seselj’s] part.”199 As recognized by the 
Prosecution, the similarities between Seselj and Milosevic are remote.200
Although Milosevic used the Serbian form of address rather than that 
customarily used at the Tribunal, Milosevic remained moderately re-
spectful to Tribunal judges.201 In the highly publicized case of United 
States v. Zacarias Moussaoui, the right to proceed pro se was revoked 
where the accused filed frivolous motions which repeatedly insulted the 
judge, among others.202 This misconduct indicates a lower threshold than 
 
 198. Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion 
for Order Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with his Defence, paras. 24–25 
(May 9, 2003). 
 199. Id. para. 26. 
 200. Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Prosecution’s Motion for Order Ap-
pointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with his Defence, para. 11 (Feb. 28, 2003) (on 
file with the author). The Prosecution stated that:  
As a former head of state, the accused Milosevic does not need to be disruptive, 
obstructionist or scandalous in order to remain in the public’s eye. Therefore, 
despite his rejection of the Tribunal and its authority as such, to date the ac-
cused Milosevic has, to a large extent, taken part in the proceedings in an or-
derly fashion. The opposite is to be expected from the accused Seselj. The ac-
cused Seselj thrives on the creation of the scandal, conspiracies and publicity. 
Id.; Seselj, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order Appointing Counsel to Assist 
Vojislav Seselj with his Defence, para. 4 (May 9, 2003). The ICTY stated that: 
The Prosecution argues that the circumstances of the Accused’s request to rep-
resent himself are distinguishable from those of Slobodan Milosevic who is 
currently the only other accused before this Tribunal conducting his own de-
fence. The Prosecution also requested the imposition of defence counsel in the 
Milosevic case, but in that case the main reason was concern about the toll that 
self-representation was taking on Milosevic’s health. In contrast to Milosevic, 
the Prosecution believes the Accused Seselj has intimated to and may behave in 
a ‘disruptive, obstructionist or scandalous’ manner. 
Id. 
 201. Molly Moore, Trial of Milosevic Holds Lessons for Iraqi Prosecutors, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 18, 2005, at A19. Theodor Meron, the president of the ICTY, remarked, 
“‘[Milosevic] complies with the rules of the game for the most part. If he insists on call-
ing the judges ‘Mister’ instead of ‘Your Honor,’ I regret that. But it doesn’t mean he’s 
not otherwise respectful to the judges.’” Id. 
 202. United States v. Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va. Nov. 14, 2003) (order ap-
pointing counsel of record), available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-
00455/docs/69412/0.pdf; Jerry Seper, Moussaoui Right to Represent Self Revoked, 
WASH. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2003, at A02, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/ 
functions/print.php?StoryID=20031114-113846-2466r. 
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the Barayagwiza or Seselj standards, but remains inapplicable to Mil-
osevic. 
There appears to be a lack of consensus with regard to the minimum 
threshold to be met to constitute obstructionism in domestic jurisdictions. 
In the U.S. case of United States v. Davis,203 counsel was assigned as the 
accused delved into obscure and irrelevant discussion whenever he was 
afforded the opportunity to speak.204 The trial in Duke v. United States205 
was infused with accusations that the prosecution was the result of a con-
spiracy to frame the accused.206 The court indicated that the accused 
could not be allowed to turn the proceeding into a “Roman holiday” or 
use his pro se status “as a launching ground for missiles, even if . . . he 
believed his best defense was . . . trying the prosecutors and witnesses for 
the prosecution.”207 Although this displays certain comparisons to the 
Milosevic case, it is arguable that the level of deliberate misconduct in 
these cases exceeds that of the former President. 
Dissentient Justice Blackmun in Faretta v. California suggested that 
the presentation of a politically inspired defense may defeat the right to 
self-representation, proposing that the right does not accommodate “the 
whimsical—albeit voluntary—caprice of every accused who wishes to 
use his trial as a vehicle for personal or political self-gratification.”208 
Similarly, in United States v. Frazier-El, the defendant’s insistence on 
representing himself so that he could present “frivolous” arguments in 
his defense was sufficient to deny him his right to proceed pro se.209
This premise stretches the theory of obstructionism to the extent that it 
excessively restricts the accused’s defense rights. According to Judge 
Antonetti’s dissenting opinion in Seselj, Faretta established that a judge 
may discontinue an accused’s self-representation if he or she “deliber-
ately adopts behavior that is serious and obstructionist.”210 According to 
 
 203. 260 F. Supp. 1009, 1021 (E.D. Tenn. 1966). 
 204. Id. at 1021. The obstructionism in Davis was due to the defendant’s mental inca-
pacities. The court found that Davis lacked sufficient mental capacity to represent him-
self. Id. 
 205. 255 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1958). 
 206. Id. at 726–27. The accused alleged that a federal judge and members of the U.S. 
Attorney’s staff were among those involved in framing him. Id. at 727. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 849 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 209. United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 560 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 210. Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on the Accused’s Motion to 
Re-examine the Decision to Assign Standby Counsel, Opinion Dissidente du Juge Anton-
etti, para. 8 (Mar. 1, 2005) (“[S]i l’accusé adopte délibérément un comportement grave et 
obstructioniste.” [“[I]f the Accused deliberately adopts behavior that is serious and ob-
structionist.”] (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46) (author’s translation)). 
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Judge Antonetti, the accused must seriously interfere with proceed-
ings,211 repeatedly breach the orders and decisions of the Trial Chamber, 
interrupt proceedings through bad behavior, or use profanities.212 Mil-
osevic did not come close to breaching this threshold of deliberate ob-
structionism. 
3.2: Unintentional Disruption 
While it is clear that while a deliberately disruptive defendant reaching 
a certain level of misconduct may be denied the pro se right, “a more 
complex problem arises when the pro se defendant unintentionally dis-
rupts the proceedings but not to an extent that would justify his perma-
nent removal from the courtroom.”213 At the outset, it is important to 
note that although a pro se defendant will inevitably take longer to pre-
sent his defense than experienced counsel will,214 “a simple lack of legal 
knowledge may not be the . . . sole reason for denying a pro se re-
quest.”215 This principle is self-evident, because if a court required a de-
 
 211. Id. para. 8 (“[L]e droit de l’accusé à se défendre lui-même peut être restreint au 
motif que l’accusé perturbe gravement le procès.” [“[T]he right of the accused to defend 
himself may be limited on grounds that the accused seriously disrupts the proceeding.”] 
(emphasis added) (translation by Brooklyn Journal of International Law)). 
 212. Id. para. 10. Judge Antonetti stated that 
La notion d’obstruction à la justice et au bon déroulement du procès doit en ef-
fet s’entendre de la violation répétée des ordres et décisions de la Chambre, de 
la perturbation du déroulement du procès par des écarts de conduite, de 
l’utilisation d’un langage outrageant ou de toute autre faute témoignant d’un 
comportement délibérément grave et obstructionniste. La Chambre ne peut pas 
à ce stade limiter le droit de l’Accusé à assurer personnellement sa défense en 
se fondant sur des « intentions » obstructionnistes.”  
[The notion of the obstruction of justice and the proper conduct of proceedings 
must involve repeated violations of order and decisions of the Chamber, distur-
bances of the proceedings through bad conduct, the use of insulting language or 
other conduct exhibiting deliberate, serious and obstructionist behaviour. The 
Chamber cannot, at this stage, restrict the right of the accused to present his 
own defence on the basis of obstructionist “intentions.”] 
Id. (author’s translation). 
 213. Homiak, supra note 5, at 920. 
 214. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“Given 
the general likelihood that pro se defendants have only rudimentary acquaintanceship 
with the rules of evidence and courtroom protocol, a measure of unorthodoxy, confusion 
and delay is likely, perhaps inevitable, in pro se cases.” (footnote omitted)). 
 215. Homiak, supra note 5, at 910; see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 
(1975) (“[A] defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in 
order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation . . . .”). 
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fendant to possess legal knowledge as a pre-requisite to granting the right 
to represent himself, the right to self-representation “would become es-
sentially meaningless.”216 In other words, an accused may elect to repre-
sent himself even if his lack of experience causes significant inefficiency 
in the proceedings.217
What is contentious in the context of the Milosevic case is the decision 
of the Trial Chamber to base its decision to assign counsel on the conse-
quences of the recurring ill health of the Accused. It is the contention of 
this paper that this innovative expansion of the circumstances in which 
the pro se right may be restricted, without the circumscription necessary 
to confine the decision to the specific circumstances of the Milosevic 
case, leaves open the possibility that the right to self-representation and 
other minimum guarantees which are composite elements of the right to 
a fair trial will in the future be abrogated. 
3.2.1: Trial Chamber Decision 
As seen in Section 1.3.1, the recurrent ill health of Milosevic inhibited 
the expeditious completion of the case.218 The Trial Chamber indicated 
that medical reports filed in July and August 2004 made it “plain . . . that 
the Accused is not fit enough to defend himself and that should he con-
tinue to represent himself, there will be further delays in the progress of 
the trial.”219 Doctors advised that Milosevic could suffer “a hypertensive 
emergency, a potentially life-threatening condition.”220 On this basis, the 
Tribunal felt obliged to assign counsel in the interest of the orderly ad-
ministration of justice.221
The Trial Chamber conceded that no precedent existed for this reason-
ing.222 Nevertheless, it promulgated the theory that “[d]isruption of a 
trial, whatever the circumstances, may give rise to the risk of a miscar-
riage of justice because the whole proceedings have not been conducted 
 
 216. Homiak, supra note 5, at 910. 
 217. Note, Hybrid Defense, supra note 26, at 346. 
 218. Trial Tr. at 32357:9–10 (Sept. 2, 2004), Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-
54-T, available at http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/040902IT.htm (“The health of the 
accused has been a major problem in the progress of the trial.”). 
 219. Id. at 32358:4–6. 
 220. Id. at 32357:24–25. 
 221. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assign-
ment of Defence Counsel, para. 65 (Sept. 22, 2004) (citing the concern that the trial could 
“last for an unreasonably long time” and noting the Tribunal’s “duty to ensure a fair and 
expeditious trial and its responsibility to preserve the integrity of its proceedings”).  
 222. Id. para. 37 (“[E]xtensive research has not led to the identification of any case in 
any jurisdiction where counsel has been assigned to an accused person because he was 
unfit to conduct his case as the result of impaired physical health . . . .”). 
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and concluded fairly.”223 This decision was based on an examination of 
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and U.N. Human Rights Committee 
(HRC) as well the jurisprudence of the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL.224 In 
contrast to its 2003 ruling, the Trial Chamber sought to demonstrate that 
the various adjudicative bodies recognized a potentially broad range of 
possible exceptions to the right to self-representation.225
Furthermore, in its 2004 ruling, the Trial Chamber relied heavily on the 
ECtHR decision in Croissant,226 despite having found in 2003 that case 
to be “distinguishable from the instant case” to the extent that it involved 
objection to appointment of additional counsel.227 It also distinguished 
from the case at hand the views of the HRC in Brian & Michael Hill v. 
Spain,228 despite having found this decision to be “highly relevant to the 
correct interpretation of Article 21(4) (d)” in its 2003 ruling.229 However, 
in its 2003 ruling, ignoring jurisprudence to the contrary,230 the Trial 
Chamber appeared to interpret the HRC’s views as prohibiting excep-
tions to the pro se right.231
 
 223. Id. para. 33. 
 224. Id. paras. 38–44. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. para. 43. 
 227. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on the 
Prosecution Motion Concerning Assignment of Counsel, para. 32 (Apr. 4, 2003). 
 228. Hill v. Spain, Commc’n No. 526/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/526/1993, para. 
14.2 (June 23, 1997). This case concerned a Spanish law which specified that although an 
accused had the right to defend himself, “‘such defence should take place by competent 
counsel, paid by the State when necessary.’” Id. The HRC found, without further discus-
sion, that the right to defend oneself under Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR had not been 
respected. Id. 
 229. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on the 
Prosecution Motion Concerning Assignment of Counsel, para. 37 (Apr. 4, 2003). The 
Tribunal further looked to the U.N. Secretary-General’s report on the Statute of the 
ICTY, which indicated that the “internationally recognized standards” relevant to the 
rights of the accused “are, in particular, contained in article 14 of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights.” Id. (quoting The Secretary-General, Report of the 
Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), 
para. 106, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993)). 
 230. Gonzalez v. Spain, Commc’n No. 1005/2001, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/74/D/1005/2001, para. 4.3 (Mar. 22, 2002); Marín Gómez v. Spain, Commc’n 
No. 865/1999, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/73/D/895/1999, para. 8.4 (Nov. 5, 2001); Torregrosa 
Lafuente v. Spain, Commc’n No. 866/1999, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/72/D/866/1999, para. 6.3 
(Aug. 31, 2001) (finding that domestic legislation implementing mandatory representa-
tion by counsel did not violate Article 14(1) of the ICCPR). 
 231. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on the 
Prosecution Motion Concerning Assignment of Counsel, para. 36 (Apr. 4, 2003) (“[T]he 
only case on the issue decided under these conventions which the Trial Chamber has been 
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Side-stepping the inaccuracy of its earlier assertions, the Trial Cham-
ber in its 2004 ruling disregarded the HRC’s views on the basis that the 
Committee had given no reason for its determination and that it was not 
faced with circumstances which could be compared to the Milosevic 
case.232 Further, although it had distinguished Barayagwiza (ICTR) in its 
2003 ruling, the Trial Chamber regarded this case 233 as well as Norman 
(SCSL)234 and the interim case of Seselj (ICTY)235 to be authority for the 
fact that “such factors as the ability of the accused to conduct his own 
defence, as well as his attitude and actions” should be taken into account 
when determining what course might be appropriate in the circum-
stances.236 This assertion markedly broadens the principles elucidated in 
these judgments. 
3.2.2: Appeals Chamber Decision 
Despite these inconsistencies in the Trial Chamber’s reasoning, the 
Appeals Chamber upheld its exercise of discretion in assigning counsel, 
reaffirming that “it cannot be that the only kind of disruption legitimately 
cognizable by a Trial Chamber is the intentional variety.”237 The reason-
ing upon which the Appeals Chamber based this premise was no more 
consistent than that of the Trial Chamber. In the form of a rather puzzling 
rhetorical question, the Appeals Chamber, in its decision, asked: 
How should the Tribunal treat a defendant whose health, while good 
enough to engage in the ordinary and non-strenuous activities of every-
day life, is not sufficiently robust to withstand all the rigors of trial 
 
able to find, did not allow for such an exception: the above mentioned Michael and Brian 
Hill v. Spain.”). 
 232. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assign-
ment of Defence Counsel, para. 44 (Sept. 22, 2004). 
 233. Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-T, Decision on Defence Coun-
sel Motion to Withdraw, para. 2; Concurring and Separate Opinion of Judge Gunawar-
dana (Nov. 2, 2000). 
 234. Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Decision on the Application of 
Samuel Hinga Norman for Self Representation Under Article 17(4)(d) of the Statute of 
the Special Court, paras. 8, 27 (June 8, 2004). 
 235. Prosecutor v. Seselj, IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order 
Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with His Defence, paras. 20, 27, 30; Dispo-
sition at 13 (May 9, 2003). 
 236. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assign-
ment of Defence Counsel, para. 38 (Sept. 22, 2004); Id. paras. 39–41 (discussing the 
aforementioned cases). 
 237. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory 
Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, para. 14 
(Nov. 1, 2004). 
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work—the late nights, the stressful cross-examinations, the courtroom 
confrontations—unless the hearing schedule is reduced to one day a 
week, or even one day a month?238
Without giving a substantive answer to this monologue, the Appeals 
Chamber went on to question whether the Tribunal ought to “be forced to 
choose between setting [such a] . . . defendant free and allowing the case 
to grind to an effective halt?”239 Giving the impression that the solution 
was self-evident, the Appeals Chamber responded ambiguously that “to 
ask that question is to answer it.”240 No further scrutiny was accorded to 
the question of non-intentional disruption. 
The manner in which the concept of non-intentional disruption was 
promulgated is wholly unsatisfactory. Neither the Appeals Chamber nor 
the Trial Chamber attempted to provide any guidance as to the degree of 
ill health necessary in order for the tribunal to acquire the discretion to 
limit the right to self-representation. The Tribunal thereby failed to spec-
ify to what extent and for how long the ill health of the accused must de-
lay proceedings in order for the tribunal to be able to exercise this discre-
tion. The necessary cause, nature, and potential duration of such ill health 
remain undetermined. 
It also remains unclear how “healthy” participants must be in order to 
qualify for pro se status before the Tribunal, or how “unhealthy” they 
must become in order for this minimum guarantee to be denied. Under 
the precedent established by the Appeals Chamber, it is to be expected 
that counsel might be assigned to every defendant, like Milosevic, with 
high blood pressure or potential heart problems. How much further this 
precedent stretches, however, remains a question of speculation. It is not 
implausible to surmise that any defendant with any potential health prob-
lems, no matter how trivial, could be denied the right to represent them-
selves in person. This possibility creates obvious anomalies, particularly 
given that the defense rights of the accused set out in Article 21(4) are 
guaranteed “in fully equality.”241
Arguably, the Tribunal deliberately phrased its reasoning in ambiguous 
terms to avoid drawing attention to the novelty of its contention, the in-
consistency in the reasoning of the chambers, and the lack of precedent 
to support it. As it stands, given the lack of definitive guidelines provided 
by the Appeals Chamber, case-by-case analysis will be required to de-
termine which circumstances will merit curtailing the right to self-
 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. (emphasis added). 
 241. ICTY Statute, supra note 12, art. 21(4). 
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representation where non-intentional delay occurs. This leaves the future 
of self-representation, as well as the other minimum guarantees in Article 
21(4) of the Statute, in unclear territory. Such lack of clarity critically 
undermines the significance of the right to self-representation and com-
promises the possibility of achieving a fair trial. 
In order to estimate the potential parameters of non-intentional disrup-
tion, it may be useful to examine the cases cited by the Appeals Cham-
ber.242 The U.S. case of Johnson v. State243 provides authority for the 
withdrawal of the right to self-representation where, as in Johnson, ex-
pert testimony indicates that defendant’s fragile mental state “might well 
succumb to the added stress of self-representation and deteriorate to the 
point where it would become necessary to continuously disrupt the pro-
ceedings to monitor his ‘present’ mental abilities and competence.”244 
This suggests that the potential ill health to which the concept of non-
intentional disruption applies appears to encompass both physical and 
mental health. The Johnson concept cannot, however, be equated to Mil-
osevic, as the capacity of the accused to stand trial was one of the matters 
at issue in Johnson.245 This position implied a level of trial disruption 
that far exceeds the Milosevic situation.246 It may, perhaps, be surmised 
that where mental health is at issue, a rather insidious level of disruption 
is necessary. 
The Milosevic Appeals Chamber also cited the U.S. case of Savage v. 
Estelle,247 where the trial court did not allow the pro se defendant to con-
 
 242. Milosevic v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory 
Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, para. 14 
n.43 (Nov. 1, 2004). 
 243. Johnson v. State, 17 P.3d 1008, 2001 Nev. LEXIS 8 (Nev. 2001). 
 244. Id., 2001 Nev. LEXIS at **28. 
 245. Id. (generally). 
 246. See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Prosecution Response to 
“Assigned Counsel Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision on Assignment of De-
fence Counsel” and to “Defence Reply to “Prosecution Motion to Strike Ground of Ap-
peal (3) from Assigned Counsel “Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision on As-
signment of Defence Counsel,”’” para. 54 (Oct. 11, 2004) (citing Prosecutor v. Strugar, 
Case No. IT-01-42-T, Decision Re the Defence Motion to Terminate Proceedings (May 
26, 2004) (“[T]here is no question that the Accused is unfit to stand trial: he clearly meets 
all the tests for fitness listed in the test recently formulated in the Strugar case.”); see also 
Milosevic v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal 
of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, para. 14 n.42 
(Nov. 1, 2004) (“We reject Assigned Counsel’s contention that Milosevic’s inability to 
represent himself necessarily rendered him unfit to stand trial at all. Trial litigation is an 
extraordinarily demanding profession. It cannot be that only those defendants capable of 
meeting its demands are formally fit to stand trial.”). 
 247. 924 F.2d 1459 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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duct voir dire, cross-examine witnesses, make objections, or argue before 
the jury without leave of court because of his incapacitating stutter.248 
This case immeasurably broadens the range of situations to which the 
Milosevic precedent may apply. A stutter is simply a speech impediment 
which relates in no way to the health of the accused, or his capacity to 
attend proceedings or stand trial. It certainly cannot be classified as “be-
havior.” Accordingly, given that the parameters of the exception recog-
nized in Milosevic remain undefined, the potential breadth of conditions 
to which the decision could apply is unsettling. 
Curiously, neither the Appeals Chamber nor the Trial Chamber re-
ferred to the proposition in Strugar that “[i]n some cases legal assistance 
to an accused may be a sufficient measure to compensate for any limita-
tions of capacity of the accused to stand trial.”249 While this proposition 
initially appears to substantiate Milosevic, Strugar in fact concerned a 
situation in which the defense claimed that the accused was unable to 
stand trial,250 a stage to which it was not foreseen that the Milosevic pro-
ceedings would degenerate.251 Hence, the Strugar proposition, rather 
than substantiating the Milosevic decision, highlights that the assignment 
of counsel is appropriate only where an extremely prohibitive level of 
disruption has occurred, i.e., to the extent that proceedings are in danger 
of completely shutting down. 
Furthermore, in Strugar, the provision of legal assistance appears to 
have been considered suitable where the individual’s incapacity to stand 
trial was “of such a nature and effect that measures can be taken to suffi-
ciently alleviate the impairment, or its effect, so that the trial can con-
 
 248. Id. at 1461. 
 249. Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Decision Re The Defence Motion to 
Terminate Proceedings, para. 39 (May 26, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/ 
strugar/trialc1/decision-e/040526.pdf. The Prosecution proposed that this decision “at a 
minimum leaves open the possibility, and at a maximum supports the contention, that ill-
health can justify the assignment of legal assistance in order to enable a trial to continue.” 
Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Prosecution Reply to “Amici Curiae 
Submissions in Response to the Trial Chamber’s “Further Order on Future Conduct of 
the Trial Concerning Assignment of Defence Counsel” Dated 6 August 2004,” para. 18 
(Aug. 19, 2004) (on file with the ICTY). 
 250. Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Decision Re the Defence Motion to 
Terminate Proceedings, para. 5 (May 26, 2004). 
 251. See Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of 
the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, at para. 14 n. 42 
(Nov. 1, 2004). (“We reject Assigned Counsel’s contention that Milosevic’s inability to 
represent himself necessarily rendered him unfit to stand trial at all. Trial litigation is an 
extraordinarily demanding profession. It cannot be that only those defendants capable of 
meeting its demands are formally fit to stand trial.”). 
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tinue.”252 The Tribunal suggested that if a defendant’s unfitness is tem-
porary, then an appropriate remedy may be to adjourn until “the accused 
has sufficiently recovered.”253 It further stated, however, that “[o]ther 
cases may require that a trial be abandoned,”254 meaning presumably that 
permanent unfitness may lead to termination of the proceedings. 
Thus, the measures suggested in Strugar were structured in a hierarchy 
whereby the measure adopted must be suitable to meet the needs of the 
circumstances of the case, or, in other words, proportionate to the interest 
pursued. Section Four will examine the disproportionality of the Appeals 
Chamber decision in Milosevic and its effect on the dignity and auton-
omy of the Accused. 
SECTION FOUR: PROPORTIONALITY 
4.1: Mode of Representation Assigned: Proportionate to Aim Pursued? 
As seen in Section 1.3.2, instead of merely appointing counsel to assist 
Milosevic with the presentation of his defense, counsel was initially as-
signed to fully represent him. This decision purported to allow the Ac-
cused to continue to “actively participate along with counsel in the 
preparation and presentation of his case.”255 His participation was, how-
ever, “secondary to that of Assigned Counsel and strictly contingent on 
the discretionary permission of the Trial Chamber in any given in-
stance.”256 Thus, the burden of the defense was placed on the Assigned 
Counsel. This situation may have been based on the supposition ex-
pressed in Parren v. State that “[t]here can be but one captain of the 
ship.”257
Subsequent to the assignment of counsel, Milosevic categorically re-
fused to question witnesses258 or cooperate with Assigned Counsel. This 
 
 252. Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Decision Re the Defence Motion to 
Terminate Proceedings, para. 39 (May 26, 2004). 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assign-
ment of Defence Counsel, para. 68 (Sept. 22, 2004) (noting that the decision “does not 
deprive him of his right to speak either by giving evidence, examining and re-examining 
witnesses as permitted by the Chamber, selecting and submitting documentary evidence, 
and making final submissions on the evidence”). 
 256. Milosevic v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory 
Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, para. 7 
(Nov. 1, 2004). 
 257. Parren v. State, 523 A.2d 597, 599 (Md. 1987). 
 258. See Trial Tr. at 32348:2–3 (Sept. 1, 2004), Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-
02-54-T, (Milosevic: “I do not accept any decrease of that right or any renouncing of that 
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mutinous situation appears to substantiate the theory propounded by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Faretta v. California that as “unwanted counsel 
‘represents’ the defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal 
fiction,” in this situation “counsel is not an assistant, but a master.”259 
Ironically, this theory was concurrently recognized by the Trial Chamber 
as “the classic statement of the right to self-representation.”260
4.1.1: Proportionality 
While the Milosevic Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber’s de-
cision to assign counsel, it acknowledged that the Trial Chamber had, by 
relegating Milosevic to a “visibly second-tier role in the trial,” sharply 
restricted the Accused’s “ability to participate in the conduct of his case 
in any way.”261 The Appeals Chamber reprimanded the Trial Chamber 
for not recognizing that restrictions on the pro se right “must be limited 
to the minimum extent necessary to protect the Tribunal’s interest in as-
suring a reasonably expeditious trial.”262 This failure, it felt, was “a fun-
damental error of law.”263
Various jurisdictions utilize a “basic proportionality principle” in con-
sidering limitations on fundamental rights, which is that “any restriction 
of a fundamental right must be in service of ‘a sufficiently important ob-
jective,’ and must ‘impair the right . . . no more than is necessary to ac-
complish the objective.’”264 The ICTY has noted that “[a] measure in 
public international law is proportional only when it is (1) suitable, (2) 
necessary and when (3) its degree and scope remain in a reasonable rela-
 
right altogether.”); Id. at 32441:8–12 (Sept. 7, 2004) (Milosevic: “I actually have no in-
tention of exercising any rights as Mr. Kay’s assistant. I’m not going to accept that, exer-
cising my right to defence in that way, that is to say depending on your mercy, that you 
are just giving me crumbs of that right and in that way I am going to exercise my right to 
defence. So I ask you that you return my right of defence to me . . . .”). 
 259. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820–21 (1975). 
 260. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assign-
ment of Counsel, para. 45 (Sept. 22, 2004). 
 261. Milosevic v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory 
Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, para. 16 
(Nov. 1, 2004). 
 262. Milosevic v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory 
Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, para. 17 
(Nov. 1, 2004). 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. (quoting de Freitas v. Permanent Sec’y of Ministry of Agric., Fisheries, Lands 
and Housing, [1998] 1 A.C. 69 (P.C.) (U.K.) (citing Zimbabwean, South African, and 
Canadian cases)).  
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tionship to the envisaged target.”265 The U.N. HRC has similarly ob-
served that restrictions on the right to freedom of movement, for exam-
ple, “must be the least intrusive instrument amongst those which might 
achieve the desired result; and they must be proportionate to the interest 
to be protected.”266 The ECtHR has also held that “there must be a rea-
sonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and 
the aim pursued.”267
According to this principle, Assigned Counsel may “do as little as 
needed to ensure judicial economy and an orderly courtroom” should the 
defendant object to counsel’s assistance.268 This was acknowledged by 
Judge Antonetti in a dissenting opinion in Seselj,269 which was handed 
down between the decisions of the Trial Chamber and the Appeals 
Chamber in Milosevic. In Seselj, it was felt that standby counsel should 
only take over the defense from the Accused at trial “in exceptional cir-
cumstances . . . should the Trial Chamber find, following a warning, that 
the Accused is engaging in disruptive conduct or conduct requiring his 
removal from the courtroom under Rule 80(B).”270
The Appeals Chamber found the significant curtailment of Milosevic’s 
role in his own defense to be disproportionate in light of the Accused’s 
 
 265. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-AR65, Decision on Fatmir Limaj’s Re-
quest for Provisional Release, para. 13 (Oct. 31, 2003), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/limaj/appeal/decision-e/031031-3.htm. 
 266. U.N. Int’l Human Rights Instruments, Compilation of General Comments and 
General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 176, para. 14, 
U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 (May 12, 2003). The HRC also stated that “[t]he applica-
tion of restrictions in any individual case must . . . meet the test of necessity and the re-
quirements of proportionality.” Id. para. 16. 
 267. Chassagnou v. France, 1999-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 21, 53. The Chassagnou court also 
held that only “indisputable imperatives” can justify restrictions on a right protected by 
the ECHR, and even then only if the restrictions are a “necessary” and “proportionate” 
means of advancing the state objective. Id. paras. 112–13; see also Croissant v. F.R.G., 
237 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 20, 43 (1992) (Messrs. Frowein, Weitzel, Schermers & Mrs. 
Liddy, dissenting) (noting that while the appointment of a third defence counsel was ap-
propriate in the light of “the public interest to ensure the proper running of the trial,” his 
active intervention in the trial was “neither necessary nor required”). 
 268. Joshua L. Howard, Hybrid Representation and Standby Counsel: Let’s Clear the 
Air for the Attorneys of South Carolina, 52 S.C. L. REV. 851, 873 (2001). 
 269. Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on the Accused’s Motion to 
Re-Examine the Decision to Assign Standby Counsel, Opinion Dissidente du Judge An-
tonetti, para. 9 (Mar. 1, 2005) (noting “[I]l convient de garder en mémoire que la mesure 
d’ingérence doit être nécessaire et proportionnée au but légitime”) [“[I]t is advisable to 
remember that the measurement of interference must be necessary and proportionate to 
the legitimate goal”] (translation by Brooklyn Journal of International Law)). 
 270. Prosecutor v. Seselj, IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order 
Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with His Defence, para. 30 (May 9, 2003). 
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vigorous two-day opening statement without interruption or apparent 
difficulty and a lack of evidence that Milosevic’s condition was perma-
nent or that he had suffered from any health problems since late July.271 
On these bases, the Appeals Chamber ordered that the practical impact of 
the assignment of counsel should be minimized “except to the extent re-
quired by the interests of justice.”272 The regime put in place thereafter 
was to be rooted, therefore, “in the default presumption that, when he 
[wa]s physically capable of doing so, Milosevic [would] take the lead in 
presenting his case.”273 The captaincy of the ship had reverted to the Ac-
cused. 
Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber was entrusted with the discretion to 
“steer a careful course” between allowing the Accused to take the lead 
and safeguarding “the Tribunal’s basic interest in a reasonably expedi-
tious resolution of the cases before it.”274 Crucially, the trial could con-
tinue in the event Milosevic was temporarily incapable of participat-
ing.275 If Milosevic elected not to continue to act as counsel, became bel-
ligerent or uncooperative, or proved incapable of conducting even part of 
the defense, the Trial Chamber could direct Assigned Counsel to proceed 
with the representation.276  
Indeed, this very situation occurred when, during the presentation of 
the evidence of defense witness Kosta Bulatovic in April 2005, the Ac-
cused was unable to attend court through illness.277 The Trial Chamber 
decided nevertheless to hear the remainder of the evidence, noting, “[i]f 
the decision of the Appeals Chamber is authoritative for anything, it 
seems to us that it authorises the completion of a witness’s testimony in 
the temporary absence of the accused.”278 Thus, while Milosevic stood at 
 
 271. Milosevic v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory 
Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, para. 18 
(Nov. 1, 2004) (footnote omitted). 
 272. Id. para. 19. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. para. 20. 
 276. See Commonwealth v. Africa, 353 A.2d 855, 864 (Pa. 1976). 
 277. The witness initially gave evidence on April 14, 2005. Trial Tr. at 38503, Prose-
cutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/050414IT.htm. He was examined in chief and partially 
cross-examined before the case was adjourned over the weekend. When the trial resumed 
on April 19, the Accused was absent through illness. Id. at 38577:5–6, available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/050419IT.htm.  
 278. Trial Tr. at 38591:1–3 (Apr. 19, 2005), Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-
54-T; see also Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-R77.4, Contempt Proceedings Against 
Kosta Bulatovic, Decision on Contempt of the Tribunal (May 13, 2005), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/judgement/bulatovic.htm; Milosevic, Case No. 
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the helm, the compass remained in the hands of the Trial Chamber. Sig-
nificantly, the Trial Chamber was careful in this instance to ensure that a 
video recording and transcript of the proceedings should be delivered to 
the Accused to enable him to review the remainder of the evidence, and 
declared that, should it be necessary, Bulatovic could be recalled.279 This 
ensured that the Accused remained in control of the presentation of the 
evidence and of his defense strategy. The Trial Chamber thereafter con-
sistently concerned itself with these interests of the Accused, adjourning 
the proceedings when Milosevic could not attend due to ill health.280 
Thus, the dignity and autonomy of the Accused were essentially pre-
served. 
4.1.2: Dignity and Autonomy 
Dignity and autonomy were first recognized in Faretta to be essential 
factors of the pro se right: “The right to defend is personal. The defen-
dant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the personal consequences 
of a conviction. It is the defendant, therefore, who must be free person-
ally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advan-
tage.”281 Supplying a defense to the accused does not sufficiently protect 
the individual’s autonomy; rather, the defense must be the individual’s 
own. In order to preserve the Faretta right to proceed pro se, it is crucial 
that the accused retains final authority over significant decisions.282 In 
McKaskle v. Wiggins, the U.S. Supreme Court held that counsel must not 
unduly interfere with the perception that the accused is acting as lead 
counsel.283 Thus, counsel “must generally respect” the defendant’s pref-
erence to proceed “solo,”284 and a defendant may not be “forced to sub-
 
IT-02-54-A-R77.4, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal on Kosta Bulatovic Contempt Pro-
ceedings (Aug. 29, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/appeal/ 
judgement/bul-cj050829e.htm. 
 279. Trial Tr. at 38591:5–8 (Apr. 19, 2005), Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-
54-T. 
 280. See, e.g., id. at 46635 (Nov. 16, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/ 
icty/transe54/051116IT.htm. Milosevic indicated, “I cannot call the next witness. I don’t 
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ing in my absence.” Id. at lines 9–11. The evidence of Lieutenant Colonel Zlatko Odak 
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 281. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975). 
 282. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178. 
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 284. Id. at 188; see also Parren v. State, 523 A.2d 597, 599 (Md. 1987). 
2007] GUARANTEE OF SELF-REPRESENTATION 599 
                                                                                                            
mit to counsel’s unwanted control.”285 This “may mitigate his distrust 
both of the criminal justice system and of his counsel” while safeguard-
ing his dignity and enlarging his freedom of choice.286
It must not be forgotten, of course, that the assistance of counsel is 
considered vital to due process,287 and particularly so in adversarial sys-
tems.288 The recognition of these two interests of the accused—“full rep-
resentation” and self-representation—as autonomous entities leads to a 
conflict “between preservation of the reliability of the judicial process 
and protection of the dignity of the defendant,”289 as it appears that “each 
right can only be exercised at the expense of the other.”290
The possibility of assigning advisory,291 standby,292 or hybrid coun-
sel293 mitigates this apparent mutual exclusivity and ensures that both the 
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viding a “safety net” in ensuring a fair trial and of eliminating delays. Anne Bowen 
Poulin, The Role of Standby Counsel in Criminal Cases: In the Twilight Zone of the 
Criminal Justice System, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 676, 707 (2000) (citing United States v. Ber-
toli, 994 F.2d 1002, 1018–19 (3d Cir. 1993); State v. Ortisi, 706 A.2d 300, 308–09 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998)). Standby Counsel can participate in the trial only to the ex-
tent that they do not usurp actual control or interfere with the perception of control. Id. 
 293. Standby counsel are not normally permitted to actively represent the defendant. 
See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178 (1984). The McKaskle Court stated that:  
[T]he pro se defendant is entitled to preserve actual control over the case he 
chooses to present to the jury. . . . If standby counsel’s participation over the 
defendant’s objection effectively allows counsel to make or substantially inter-
fere with any significant tactical decisions, or to control the questioning of wit-
nesses, or to speak instead of the defendant on any matter of importance, the 
Faretta right is eroded. 
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interests of justice and those of the defendant are duly protected.294 As-
signed Counsel in Milosevic essentially functioned as “hybrid” counsel, 
as they shared the role of defense counsel with the Accused. This consti-
tuted a “co-counsel” model295 which involved actual assistance in the 
trial proceedings. Thus, the Accused simultaneously exercised his rights 
to counsel and to represent himself, consistent with the nature of hybrid 
representation.296
4.2: Hybrid Representation and Milosevic 
The hybrid model was the most suitable for the Milosevic case. Famili-
arity with the vast and countless facts, figures, locations, and witnesses 
made the Accused more suited to conducting certain aspects of his de-
fense.297 This was particularly important as political and moral beliefs 
were central to the Accused’s defense.298 Hybrid representation allowed 
Milosevic to publicly conduct cross-examination and examination-in-
chief while relinquishing to counsel those procedural and substantive 
tasks which required the legal skills at which they excel.299
Hybrid representation “is more likely to encourage efficiency and order 
than to promote chaos.”300 It also serves to preserve judicial neutrality.301 
This is because inexperienced pro se defendants often rely on judges for 
assistance in legal and procedural matters,302 and hybrid representation 
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can “protect[] the trial judge from the moral, if not legal, obligation to 
help the defendant,” thus allowing “the judge to remain a neutral arbitra-
tor rather than . . . becom[ing] an active participant in the trial.”303 Fur-
thermore, this also allows the victim, the prosecutor, and the witnesses to 
see the judge as impartial.304
Problems arise, however, from the ambiguity of the relationship be-
tween the hybrid counsel and the accused.305 Without a defined role, hy-
brid counsel are cast into “an uncomfortable twilight zone.”306 Normally 
holding a position of complete autonomy and control, counsel must al-
low the accused to feel in control.307 Thus, hybrid representation “poses 
a risk of clashing wills.”308 Moreover, while hybrid counsel are only sup-
posed to assist when the accused so requests, well-intentioned co-counsel 
often cannot remain idle while the defendant makes mistakes.309 This 
ultimately could lead to the accused feeling “short-changed” or to believe 
that counsel is forcibly interfering with his case. This “undermines the 
appearance of fairness and places counsel in the untenable position of 
supporting a hostile pro se defendant.”310
The Assigned Counsel in Milosevic overcame these obstacles, curbing 
their public role in trial proceedings to the disputation of procedural mat-
ters beyond the expertise of the pro se Accused. The Assigned Counsel 
comprehensively fulfilled their dual obligation to the Chamber and to the 
Accused through the filing of innumerable public and confidential writ-
ten submissions on behalf of the Accused, and responding on his behalf 
and in his interests to those of the Office of the Prosecution, the Cham-
bers and the Registry.311 It is a credit to the professionalism, patience, 
and sound judgment of Mr. Kay and Ms. Higgins that they fulfilled their 
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duties without compromising the wishes of the Accused. Ultimately, 
Milosevic maintained full control over the witnesses called in his de-
fense, and over his defense strategy. 
In conclusion, regardless of the substantive deficiencies of the Trial 
Chamber decision, the Appeals Chamber must be commended for its ap-
plication of the principle of proportionality to the manner in which the 
Assigned Counsel would function in trial proceedings. It is hoped that 
the application of the principle of non-intentional disruption to the right 
of self-representation, particularly in the domain of ill health, will be 
strictly circumscribed, and conducted in such a manner as to truly accord 
“full equality” to the minimum defense guarantees of the accused, as re-
quired by Article 21(4) of the ICTY Statute. 
